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ARTICLES
LAW AND MACROECONOMICS:
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LITIGATION OVER THE
BUSINESS CYCLE
JOHN

J. DONOHUE.III* & PETER
I.

SIEGELMAN**

INTRODUCTION

For the past two decades the law and economics movement has been
one of the most influential forces in the legal academy. Its practitioners
have relentlessly sought to unleash microeconomic insights on formerly
pristine areas of legal doctrine. This Article focuses on a branch of lawemployment discrimination-that has already been examined from a
microeconomic perspective.1 However, it represents a departure from the
previous literature in that it considers the impact of macroeconomicphe-

nomena on several aspects of employment discrimination litigation.
*
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I. The seminal work in the economics of employment discrimination is GARY S. BECKER,
THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971). Other important theoretical contributions
come from Kenneth Arrow, Models ofJob Discriminationin the LaborMarket, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 187 (Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972), and Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory ofRacism andSexism, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 659 (1972). The theoretical and empirical
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While law and macroeconomics is quite novel in the legal academic
literature,2 there are a number of reasons for adopting a macroeconomic

perspective in analyzing the legal system in general and employment discrimination in particular. First, looking at federal antidiscrimination law
from a macroeconomic perspective suggests new ways of understanding

the nature of the protection antidiscrimination law offers. As we show in
this Article, a strong economy is a powerful ally for victims of discrimi-

nation. Indeed, many such individuals have deemed this market remedy
to be preferable to the legal remedies for discrimination that have been in
place for the past twenty-five years. When the economy is healthy, victims of discrimination can more easily find new jobs without suffering an
extended period of unemployment. Many potential litigants bypass their
legal remedies when they believe that adequate market opportunities
exist. Conversely, a recessionary economy, and the excess supply of

labor that attends it, creates an opportunity for employers to indulge discriminatory preferences and choose workers on the basis of irrational
prejudice or tastes. Our analysis also suggests that Title VII functions as
a kind of unemployment insurance: It affords special protection to
selected workers who lose their job and are unemployed for a substantial
period of time.
work has recently been surveyed by Glen G. Cain, The Economic Analysis of LaborMarketDiscrimination:A Survey, in HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 693 (Orley Ashenfelter & R. Layard eds.,
1986).
In the law and economics community, recent works include the debates between Judge Posner
and John J. Donohue III over race discrimination, published in the PennsylvaniaLaw Review (198687), and sex discrimination, in the Chicago Law Review (1989); RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992); and John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43
STAN. L. REv. 983 (1991).
2. This is the first article of which we are aware that shows that potential beneficiaries of an
important federal statutory right are quite sensitive to the state of the macroeconomy in making
decisions about whether to initiate litigation. There have been numerous articles, however, focusing
on the relationship between the macroeconomy and phenomena of importance to legal scholars and
policymakers. For example, an extensive literature explores the effect of recession on the crime rate.
See Phillip Cook & Gary Zarkin, Crime andthe Business Cycle, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1985); Llad
Phillips et al., Crime, Youth, and the LaborMarket, 80 J. POL. ECON. 491 (1972). Recent work has
also demonstrated that accident rates in manufacturing industries also tend to move with the business cycle. See John Shea, Accident Rates, Labor Effort, and the Business Cycle (1991) (unpublished paper, on file with the authors). There are also important articles discussing the potential
macroeconomic problems created by requiring the federal budget to remain balanced. See Kate
Stith, Rewriting the FiscalConstitution: The Case ofGramm-Rudman-Hollings,76 CAL. L. REv. 595
(1988); see also Mark Kelman, Could Lawyers Stop Decisions? Speculations on Law and
Macroeconomics (Aug. 1992) (unpublished paper, on file with the Stanford Law School) (suggesting
that certain legal reforms could reduce unemployment).
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Second, examining the sharp changes in the number and character
of employment discrimination lawsuits induced by short-term cyclical
swings in the economy provides valuable insights into the character of
employment discrimination litigation. When the economy goes into a
recession, some dramatic changes occur in employment discrimination
litigation: The number of cases filed in federal court jumps dramatically
(while the impact on the number of EEOC filings is relatively minor);
moreover, the plaintiff win rate falls (while the monetary amount of the
awards by federal judges to successful plaintiffs increases significantly).
These are some of the findings this paper seeks to explain. Moreover,
illuminating these findings can serve to sharpen our understanding of two
conflicting visions of employment discrimination litigation. One possible
theory is that the surge of litigation during economic downturns shows
that when times are bad individuals look around for economic life rafts,
and employment discrimination litigation offers the possibility of just
such a windfall to the class of protected workers. This generally pessimistic assessment of the operation of employment discrimination law
might view the cyclical pattern of filings as strong evidence of rent-seeking on the part of the litigants.
An alternative theory offers a far more optimistic picture of antidiscrimination litigation: Given that only a small fraction of those who perceive themselves as victims of employment discrimination seek legal
redress, and given the serious and pervasive nature of the employment
discrimination problem, the jump in cases during recessions is unambiguously positive because it brings us closer to the appropriate level of
employment discrimination litigation. While our circumstantial evidence
cannot resolve the controversy over whether employment discrimination
litigation is predominantly benign or generally lamentable rent-seeking,
it does cast strong doubt on the most extreme version of the rent-seeking
hypothesis. Individuals do not appear to complain of employment discrimination to the EEOC at higher rates simply because the economy is
weak. In other words, the cyclicality of employment discrimination filings in federal court is not the product of more complaints of discrimination, but rather it is the result of a higher proportion of existing
complaints ending up in federal court.
Third, our analysis of the determinants of litigation behavior provides new insights concerning the responsiveness of potential litigants to
incentives and to changing circumstances. Critics of the economic model
have suggested that whether someone with a potential claim decides to
initiate a lawsuit depends largely on subjective cultural, psychological,
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and sociological factors that are impossible to specify in advance.3 Our
results, by contrast, demonstrate that a large number of plaintiffs in
employment discrimination cases seem to alter their behavior over the
course of the business cycle in predictable and rational ways and are
indeed more likely to pursue federal court litigation when their expected
damages are higher. On the other hand, we establish that although prospective employment discrimination plaintiffs respond to the negative
consequences that flow from a recessionary economy, they do not seem
to anticipate these consequences very well. In other words, these prospective litigants do not manifest the degree of foresight that the more
eager proponents of the view of rational actors maximizing their welfare
might impute to them.
The outline of this Article is as follows: Part II documents the
extent to which the number of employment discrimination suits rises
during recessions and falls during times of economic prosperity. Part III
discusses various worker and employer influences that could generate the
cyclical pattern of employment discrimination litigation in the context of
a simple model of the decision to file a lawsuit.
In Part IV we provide several empirical tests to help distinguish
among the possible explanations for the cyclical pattern observed. These
tests include (1) a comparison of the cyclicality of two different types of
lawsuits-those ified against the U.S. government and those fied against
other employers; (2) a comparison of the lag between the occurrence of a
litigation-generating event and the filing of a lawsuit and the lag between
the onset of recession and the upturn in case filings; (3) a demonstration
that EEOC filings are not significantly influenced by the business cycle;
and (4) an analysis of the kinds of incidents that generate litigation. All
four of these tests suggest the same conclusion: The most significant link
between the business cycle and the volume of litigation is that when
deciding whether to fie in federal court, workers are sensitive to the level
of damages they have already experienced (but they are not good at
anticipating these costs t the time of injury). Because the average duration of unemployment spells increases in a recessionary economy, monetary awards are elevated, inducing more litigants to proceed to federal
court with their claims of discrimination. This we refer to as the worker
benefits effect.
Further evidence of the importance of this mechanism is presented
in Part V. There, we demonstrate that plaintiffs win less often (and settle
3. In the context of employment discrimination litigation, see, e.g., KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE
CIVIL RIGHTS SociETY (1988).

1993]

LAW AND MACROECONOMICS

or drop a higher proportion of cases filed) during macroeconomic slumps
than during booms. We also show that average awards to successful
plaintiffs rise in business downturns, as predicted by our hypothesis that
the worker benefits effect causes the cyclicality of employment discrimination litigation.
Finally, we draw on our findings to address one of the most important and hotly debated questions concerning the Civil Rights Act of
1991: What effect will increasing the potential damage awards in Title
VII cases, by adding punitive and compensatory damages to the current
limited back-pay remedy, have on the volume of litigation?
II. THE BUSINESS CYCLE AND THE VOLUME OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION
A.

DATA

Our primary data source in establishing the effect of the business
cycle on the volume of and outcomes in employment discrimination litigation is a computer tape, compiled by the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts, that contains a complete listing of all federal employment
civil rights cases filed in U.S. district court between July 1, 1969, and
June 30, 1989. 4 To supplement our understanding of the range of
employment discrimination cases contained on our tape, we also
examined some 1250 randomly selected civil rights employment cases in
seven cities around the United States.' By going back to the original case

files, we were able to learn much about the cases that is not contained on
4. For all cases, the records list the date the case was filed, which makes it possible to construct a quarterly time series of the volume of litigation. The tape also identifies the parties' names,
the basis of jurisdiction, and whether the case was still open as of June 30, 1989.
Each case is supposed to be identified by a docket number unique within each district. We
found a small number of cases with identical docket numbers and identical or similar party names
(e.g., Shrnoo v. Weinberger and Shmoo v. Secretary of Defense), which prompted us to delete the
duplicate from the data set. We also deleted all cases whose jurisdiction code indicated that they
originated outside the federal court system. For further details on the Administrative Office Data
Tape, see Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 1; Theodore Eisenberg, The RelationshipBetween Plaintiff Success Rates Before Trial and at Trial, 154 J. ROYAL STAT. Soc'y 111 (1991).
Additional information on case outcomes-whether there was an adjudication of the dispute,
which party won at trial, and how much damages were awarded-exists for a small minority of the
cases. For a further discussion of outcomes, see infra part IV.
5. The cities are New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Atlanta, New Orleans, Dallas, and San
Francisco. These cities were chosen because they are the locations of the federal records centers
where the files are housed. Together, they accounted for just under 20% of all employment discrimination cases filed in the federal courts between 1972 and 1987. Within each city we randomly
selected cases for inclusion in the sample.
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the Administrative Office data tape, such as the basis of the alleged discrimination (race, sex, national origin, age, etc.), the nature of the alleged
discriminatory conduct (failure to hire, firing, adverse conditions of
employment, etc.), and the plaintiff's occupation, industry, and salary.
Table 1 uses the data from this seven-city sample to give a sense of
the relative frequency of the various statutory and constitutional bases
for employment discrimination claims. As the table indicates, more than
three quarters of the employment discrimination cases in our sample
raised claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and one third
of all cases raised a section 1981 claim based on the Reconstruction Era
Civil Rights Act.
B.

ESTABLISHING THE EMPIRICAL LINK BETWEEN UNEMPLOYMENT
AND LITIGATION

In an earlier article we noted that the number of employment discrimination cases filed in federal courts has increased drastically over the
past twenty years but that this growth has been quite uneven.6 Figure 1
shows that there have been sharp upturns in the number of cases filed as
well as periods of relative stagnation and even decline. We were immediately struck by one pattern that suggested the possible importance of a
political phenomenon: During the Nixon and Ford administrations and
then at the outset of the Reagan Administration, the number of employment discrimination cases rose sharply, while the caseload declined in
each of the four years of the Carter Administration. When we began to
explore the data more systematically, however, we learned that the deviations from the long-term growth trend in case filings were closely correlated with the business cycle, as measured by the national unemployment
rate. This persuaded us that the health of the economy was the most
likely cause of the pronounced cyclical variation in the level of case lings, rather than sociological or political phenomena associated with the
ideologies of different political administrations.7
6. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 1.
7. Much research has concluded that the economy is affected by the political business cycle.
See EDWARD TUFrE, POLMcAL CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY (1978); Alberto Alesina & Jeffrey

Sacks, PoliticalParties and the Business Cycle in the US., 20 J. MONEY CREDrr & BANKING 63
(1988); William Nordhaus, The PoliticalBusiness Cycle, 42 REv. ECON. STUD. 169 (1975). American Presidents like to engineer (or have the Federal Reserve Board "fine-tune") the economy so that
recessions occur early in their term-when the hard times can more plausibly be blamed on the
excesses and errors of the prior administration-followed by strong recoveries as the next election
approaches. Our point is not that the business cycle itself is unaffected by political phenomena, but
rather that the proximate cause of the observed countercydlical pattern of filings of employment
discrimination cases is the state of the economy.

1993]

LAW AND MACROECONOMICS

TABLE 1:
LEGAL BASES FOR SUITS CODED "CIVIL RIGHTS,
EMPLOYMENT" (NATURE OF SUIT = 442), 1972-1987
% OF ALL EMPL.

CIVL RIGHTS
STATUTE

DEsCRITION

Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act

Most important source of protection from
employment discrimination on basis of race,
sex, national origin, or religion. Created
EEOC (initially limited to investigation and
conciliation of complaints). Modified in
1972 to allow suits by EEOC. Plaintiffs
must meet strict procedural requirements
(exhaust administrative remedies). Before
1991, remedies were limited to injunctive
relief and back pay (no other compensatory
or punitive damages, no right to jury trial).
Now covers all employers with more than 15
employees, unions, employment agencies,
etc.
"All citizens shall have the same right to
make and enforce contracts as white citizens." In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the statute applies to employment
contracts. Covers only race discrimination.
Damages in addition to back pay available.
Looser procedural requirements and statute
of limitations than Title VII. Jury trials
available. No restrictions on size of firms
covered.
Forbids denial "under cover of state action"
of any rights secured by the U.S. Constitution or federal law. Applies only to discrimination by government entities. Remedies
essentially those of § 1981.
Forbids discrimination in employment by
federal contractors on the basis of age.

§ 1981 of the 1866
Civil Rights Act

§ 1983 of the 1871
Civil Rights Act

Age Discrimination in
Employment Act
(ADEA) of 1967
Rehabilitation Act of
1973
U.S. Constitution

Pendant State Claims
Other

Forbids discrimination in employment by
federal contractors on the basis of handicapped status.
Fifth and 14th amendments prohibit denial
of due process by governments. Government employees can challenge discharge,
failure to promote, etc., if proper procedures
were not followed.
Plaintiffs can attach claims under state law
to any of the above.
Equal Pay Act, Labor Relations Act, etc.

CASES RAISING
A CLAIM BASED
ON STATUTE

75.5

33.1

13.6

10.3
0.5
10.8

0.9
14.1

Note: The final column was calculated from an American Bar Foundation survey of employment
civil rights cases that examined 1247 randomly selected cases in seven federal judicial districts.
Because cases may state a claim under more than one statute, the figures in the final column do not
sum to 100%.
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To capture the effects of the business cycle on the volume of litiga-

tion, we estimated a very simple regression model, in which the number
of suits filed in a quarter is a function of time (the number of quarters
since the data began in the third quarter of 1969), time2 , and lagged values of the unemployment rate.' Table 2 lays out the basic results of this
analysis in seven different regression equations. These regressions clearly

demonstrate a statistically significant relationship between the unemployment rate and the volume of employment discrimination litigation: When

the economy booms, employment discrimination case filings fall in the
next half year; when the economy slumps, case filings rise over the next
half year. Each of these simple equations explains roughly ninety-five
percent of the variance in the number of cases filed. From equation 6,
we estimate that each additional percentage point of unemployment cor-

responds to an extra 151 suits fied (after a lag of two quarters). Moreover, with an elasticity of about 0.7,9 a relatively modest rise in the
unemployment rate from, say, 5% to 6.5% (which is a 30% increase)
would generate a 21% increase in the number of employment discrimination cases.
III.

THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE LINK

The evidence presented thus far has demonstrated a strong statisti-

cal relationship between the state of the economy, as measured by the
unemployment rate, and the volume of federal employment discrimination cases. The aggregate statistics considered thus far mask a complex

set of behaviors and decisions that ultimately determine the net effect of
the unemployment rate on the number of employment discrimination
8. The links between the business cycle and the volume of litigation are complicated, and the
best way of capturing them is not obvious. Rather than dwelling at length on these technical issues
here, we relegate them to an appendix, which is available on request from the authors. The gist of
the appendix can be summarized as follows: The relationship between the business cycle and the
other phenomena of interest, such as the volume of litigation and plaintiff win rates, may be analyzed
in various ways. Among the alternatives considered were using first-differences; using detrended
variables, including linear and quadratic trends; and using alternative measures of the business cycle,
such as the number of unemployed job losers. In sum, our conclusions are not merely artifacts of the
econometric methods we have used.
9. The elasticity of 0.7 means that a 1% increase in the unemployment rate generates a 0.7%
increase in the number of employment discrimination cases filed in federal court. We rely on equation 6 because it includes only the unemployment rate figures that significantly affect the number of
cases filed.
In addition to the unemployment effects, Table 2 and Figure 1 also document the previously
mentioned rapid and sustained rise in the volume of employment discrimination suits. We analyze
the long-term trends, including the growth in and changing composition of litigation (from hiring to
firing suits), in the companion to this Article, Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 1.
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TABLE 2:
REGRESSIONS EXPLAINING THE NUMBER OF
EMPLOYMENT CIVIL RIGHTS SUITS FILED IN FEDERAL
COURTS, 1969:II TO 1989:11, CORRECTED FOR
AUTOCORRELATION USING MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD
(N = 80 QUARTERLY OBSERVATIONS)
EQUATION

Variable
Constant

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
-142.33
-52.61
-549.39 -639.39 -620.35
-692.53 -685.51
(-0.87) (-0.87) (-4.17) (-4.92) (-4.54) (-5.63) (-5.38)
Time (Quarter
54.46
58.13
36.04
30.88
31.93
28.72
29.13
Since 1969:111)
(5.87)
(5.13)
(5.17)
(4.47)
(4.37)
(4.32)
(4.20)
Time 2
-0.36
-0.40
-0.08
-0.11
-0.12
-0.09
-0.09
(-3.27) (-2.98) (-2.02) (-1.42) (-1.40) (-1.14) (-1.16)
% Unemployment Rate
-22.12
-2.50
-27.06
-28.91
in Current Quarter
(-0.95) (-0.13) (-1.34) (-1.41)
Unemployment Rate
111.79
105.71
110.01
102.88
104.90
in Previous Quarter
(5.60)
(5.72)
(5.36)
(5.58)
(5.15)
Unemployment Rate
59.52
61.25
48.33
48.85
Lagged 2 Quarters
(2.96)
(2.98)
(2.62)
(2.62)
Unemployment Rate
-10.20
-4.90
Lagged 3 Quarters
(-0.49)
(-2.24)
Summary Statistics
Rho-hat
0.75
0.79
0.60
0.60
0.61
0.60
0.60
Adj. R?
0.90
0.93
0.95
0.96
0.95
0.95
0.95
Durb-Wats
1.97
1.91
2.00
2.00
2.00
1.98
1.99
- 5
SSR (xl0 )
15.53
15.51
11.20
10.01
9.98
10.26
10.25
Notes: For all regressions, the dependent variable is the number of original jurisdiction
employment civil rights suits filed per calendar quarter (purged of duplicate docket numbers).
T-statistics are in parentheses.
Sources: Administrative Office of U.S. Courts Data Tape (number of employment discrimination suits); Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business (nonseasonally adjusted
unemployment rate).

cases. The effects of conflicting influences are netted out in these aggregate statistics; yet, it is precisely these separate influences that we are

most interested in identifying. In general, the unemployment rate can
influence the amount of employment discrimination litigation by affecting (1) the propensity of workers to sue for a given amount of perceived
discrimination; (2) the amount of actual discrimination against workers;
and (3) the number of incidents that might be perceived as discriminatory conduct or as constituting an opportunity for generating revenue by
claiming discrimination. We next systematically examine these various
worker and employer effects in order to clarify the relationship between
the health of the economy and the employment discrimination caseload.
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A.

WORKER EFFECTS

We begin with a simple heuristic model that describes the links
between employment discrimination litigation and the business cycle by
focusing on the worker's decision to bring a lawsuit once the employer
has acted in a manner adverse to the worker. In other words, the model
focuses on the factors that determine whether a worker will sue, given
the employer's adverse conduct. It does not tell us how much discrimination or how many adverse employer actions have occurred, both of
which, we shall see, are potentially significant factors in determining the
volume of employment discrimination litigation. Nevertheless, the
model is a useful device for illustrating some of the ways a change in the
unemployment rate is likely to influence the volume of such litigation.
The ensuing discussion expands the analysis to include the impact of the
business cycle on both the level of discrimination and the number of incidents that might conceivably generate litigation.10
1. A Heuristic, ComparativeStatics Model of the Decision to Sue
A rational, risk-neutral worker who is considering whether to bring
an employment discrimination suit against an employer should be willing
to bring any suit for which the expected value is positive." To illuminate
the elements of the decision that the worker must make, we introduce the
following notation. Let:
p = the plaintiff's expected probability of winning, which we take
to be a positive function of the amount of discrimination.
Formally, dp/d8 > 0.
8 = the severity of discrimination suffered by the plaintiff.'2 The
relationship between 8 and the unemployment rate (U) has
an uncertain sign, so d8/dU could be positive or negative.
C = the plaintiff's legal costs.
10. See infra part III.B.1-2.
11. This simple model omits any consideration of nonpecuniary motives, such as revenge and
vindictiveness, and, more significantly, it does not consider strategic behavior such as that characteristic of nuisance suits. For a wide-ranging survey of litigation models that do encompass such behavior, see Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their
Relations, 27 J. ECON. LrrERATURE 1067 (1989).
12. This variable could be thought of as an index number ranging from zero to 100, reflecting
the percentage of an employment decision attributable to discriminatory bias. In the case of a purely
meritocratic decision 8 = 0, and in the case of a purely racially motivated act, 8 = 100.
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J = the amount of the judgment awarded (if plaintiff wins),
which is wD(U), 13 where
U = the unemployment rate.
D = the duration of the plaintiff's unemployment spell following
rejection (i.e., the employer's decision not to hire or to terminate). Higher unemployment rates are associated with
longer durations of unemployment spells, so dD/dU > 0.
w = the plaintiff's wage in the job for which plaintiff was rejected

(not hired, terminated, etc.).
Notice that the size of the back-pay award depends on the length of the
plaintiff's unemployment spell, D, which is in turn a positive function of
U. 14 The amount of discrimination is also a function of U. For reasons
discussed below, it is not clear whether the effect of an increase in unemployment is to raise or lower the amount of discrimination, although
there seem to be good reasons to believe that db/dU is positive.
13. Paul Cox has summarized the status of the law on monetary damages in employment discrimination cases during the time covered by our data: "[Title VII provides only equitable remedies;
damages other than backpay are not recoverable." PAUL Cox, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION 517 (1987) (citing DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796 (1st Cir. 1980); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler
Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 192 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1978); Pearson v. Western Elec.
Installation Org., 542 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1976)).
Reinstatement, promotion, and changes in employment practices are also available as remedies,
but our data suggest that these awards are substantially less common than back-pay awards. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 1, at 983.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act offers a limited form of punitive damages, available only on proof of a willful violation of the statute: double recovery of actual damages. Cox,
supra,at 23-14; see, eg., Fortino v. Quasar Co., 751 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. I1. 1990) (awarding double
damages as liquidated damages for willful violation of the ADEA). Punitive and compensatory
damages as such, however, appear to be unavailable under the ADEA. Cox, supra, at 23-16. Suits
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 provide for punitive damages in addition to back pay.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.), substantially changed the types of damages allowed under Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes, but these changes are not relevant for the cases in our sample, all of which
closed before the Act took effect.
14. For recent evidence on the relationship between unemployment durations and the business
cycle, see Mark Dynarski & Steven M. Sheffrin, The Behaviorof Unemployment Durationsover the
Cycle, 72 REv. ECON. & STAT. 350, 350-56 (1990), and Michael Baker, Unemployment Duration:
CompositionalEffects and Cyclical Variability, 82 AM. ECON. REv. 313, 321 (1992). Both studies
conclude that unemployment durations increase with the unemployment rate. Dynarski and Sheffrin find that the elasticity of duration of unemployment with respect to the unemployment rate is
between 1.03 and 1.46. Controlling for worker heterogeneity at a more aggregate level, Baker estimates the elasticity to be about 0.6. It is almost 0.75 for workers who are unemployed because they
have lost their job.
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Under Title VII's one-way fee-shifting rules, 1" the net expected
value of a suit to a plaintiff is
(1) E(S) = pwD - (I-p)C.
Equation (1) simply states that the probability of success times the backpay award, minus the probability of losing times the costs of bringing the
suit, is a measure of the expected value of the lawsuit to the plaintiff. 6
We noted earlier that the probability of the plaintiff winning is a function
of the amount of discrimination suffered by the plaintiff, and that both
the amount of discrimination and the duration of unemployment are
likely to be functions of the unemployment rate, U. We can rewrite
equation (1) to reflect these functional relationships as follows:
(2) ECS) = p(5(U))wD(U) - (1 -p(5(U)))C.
Rearranging, we can solve for the minimum wage, w*, necessary to make
suing worthwhile for the plaintiff:

(3) w* = (1-p((U)))C/p(5(U))D(U).
By differentiating with respect to U, we can trace out the effects of the
unemployment rate on the minimum wage necessary to bring suit:
(4) Ow*/O =-UC/p'8"D + (1-p)pD'/(pD) 2 < Ofor 8'> 0.17
Thus, an increase in unemployment lowers the threshold wage necessary
to bring suit. For a given distribution of wages in the economy and a
given amount of discrimination, then, a rise in the unemployment rate
should increase the volume of litigation.' 8
15. In Title VII litigation, winning plaintiffs recover their legal fees from defendants, while
winning defendants do not collect legal fees from plaintiffs unless "the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
16. The back-pay award is the weekly wage, w, times the number of weeks of unemployment,
D. Note that employment discrimination plaintiffs frequently retain lawyers under contingency fee
agreements. In such cases, the plaintiff will not necessarily consider the expected cost of bringing the
lawsuit (i.e., (1-p)C). Contingency fee attorneys will screen the cases, however, to make sure that
their expected fee (p0) is equal to or greater than the opportunity cost of their time plus any incidental litigation expenses, such as filing fees, depositions, and expert witness fees. To keep this model as
simple as possible, we do not consider the impact of discounting the awards and costs to their present values.
17. The assumption that the severity of discrimination, 6, rises or remains constant as the
unemployment rate rises is plausible, but not beyond dispute. See infra text accompanying note 23.
18. More precisely, let F(w) describe the distribution of wages paid in the economy, which
implies that l-F(w*) is the percentage of workers earning more than the threshold wage, w*. The
number of suits filed is thus some positive function of G(w*) = 1-F(w*). As w* falls, G(w*)
increases, as does the number of suits.
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The Worker Benefits Effect

Equation (4) tells us that discharged workers should find it more
attractive to bring a suit if they have been fired during a recession rather
than during a boom. This is so because the damages that can be received
in an employment discrimination case are limited to back pay, which
depends on the duration of unemployment before a new job is secured.
As the unemployment rate increases, so does the length of the average
spell of unemployment. This, in turn, increases the expected benefitback-pay damages-for potential plaintiffs. By lowering the threshold
wage level needed to make suits profitable, an economic slump encourages more potential plaintiffs to bring suit, and the number of suits filed
thus goes up. We refer to this phenomenon as the worker benefits effect
or the back-pay effect. Put differently, even when the employer's treatment of the worker is held constant, the worker benefits effect tells us
that there is a greater likelihood of suit-a higher propensity to sueduring an economic slump because expected damages are higher during
such periods. 9
19. In addition to the prospect of higher damages, another possible reason why victims of
perceived employment discrimination would be more likely to sue during slumps than during booms
is that suing is time-consuming. Even if the damages to be received were identical, therefore, one
might expect an unemployed worker to have more time to pursue litigation than a newly rehired
worker would have. This "opportunity cost effect" suggests that the cost of bringing a suit falls
when one is unemployed.
Although we do not explicitly model the opportunity cost effect, it can easily be reconciled with
the worker benefits effect simply by noting that they both suggest that the net benefits for the plaintiff
of bringing a lawsuit are greater during business downturns than in booms. Our data are not sufficiently rich to distinguish empirically between these two effects. Indeed, in Title VII cases, for
which monetary damages were previously limited to back pay, these two effects will overlap exactly:
A longer duration of unemployment will increase the level of damages and reduce the opportunity
cost of pursuing litigation in identical amounts. With sufficient information on 42 U.S.C. § 1981
cases, for which compensatory and punitive damages have long been available, one might find
enough examples in which monetary awards could be pursued even in the absence of a spell of
unemployment, thereby providing an opportunity to distinguish empirically the worker benefits and
opportunity cost effects.
There is, however, a conflicting worker effect that could conceivably cause more suits to be
brought during booms. Specifically, there is much evidence suggesting that only a small percentage
of the instances of perceived employment discrimination that occur on the job lead to lawsuits, in
part because workers generally do not want to sue their current employer. See, eg., BUMILLER,
supranote 3; BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC (1977); Richard E. Miller
& Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformationof Disputes, 15 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 3-4, 525-65
(1980-81). For a dissenting view that perceived victims of discrimination are actually not less likely
to sue than others, see Herbert M. Kritzer et al., To Confront or Not to Confront: Measuring Claiming Rates in Discrimination Grievances,25 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 875 (1991). If the major fear that
keeps current employees from suing is the risk of retaliatory discharge, then a highly prosperous
economy might embolden victimized workers to bring suit. Furthermore, employers are presumably
less likely to fire someone when there is much work to be done and replacement workers are difficult
to find. For anecdotal evidence supporting the importance of this effect, see HartfordReports Drop
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B.

EMPLOYER BEHAVIOR

1. The Effect of a Slump on the Amount of Discrimination
A second possible influence of the business cycle on the volume of
litigation is the link between the amount of discrimination and the unemployment rate. There are two conflicting factors at work here.

On the one hand, employers with discriminatory tastes may find it
cheaper to discriminate when the unemployment rate is high because

slack labor markets make it easier for them to find white males to substitute for blacks or women. In other words, when there is an excess supply
of job applicants, employers can pick and choose among those queuing
for a job and can more easily select applicants on the basis of race or
gender.2" The availability effect-when white males are more available,

discriminatory employers find it easier to indulge their preference for
such workers-thus suggests that discrimination may increase during
slumps. This, in turn, means that the plaintiff's probability of winning,
p, is now a positive function of the unemployment rate because plaintiffs
are more likely to win a case given higher "levels" of discrimination (dpi
d5 > 0 by assumption). As a result, the threshold wage, w*, will be
lower and the volume of litigation should be higher in slumps than in

booms. This countercyclical pattern would reinforce the worker benefits
effect discussed above.
The second effect, however, suggests that discrimination might
move procyclically. The employer damages effect is simply the reverse of
in Bias Complaints,N.Y. Tms, Apr. 7, 1992, at A16 (quoting state official as saying, "It's speculation, but based on the rocky job market it's likely that people are complaining less about conditions if
they have a job."). Because this factor would tend to cause the filings of employment discrimination
cases to be procylical-higher in booms, lower in recessions-rather than countercyelical, as Table
2 indicates, we consider it to be less significant than either the worker benefits effect or the opportunity cost effect. Moreover, there are two reasons for expecting this effect to be modest. First, most
employment discrimination plaintiffs are not actually working for the defendant at the time suit is
filed. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 1, at 1025-27 (figs. 6 & 7). Thus, the scope of operation of
this possible conflicting effect is weakened. Second, while workers might feel that a boom affords
them some protection, they would probably expect that retaliation would always be possible in any
subsequent downturn.
20. This is precisely analogous to the microeconomic analysis that Becker, Friedman, and Posner use to discuss the effects of unions and minimum wage laws on employment discrimination.
Anything that creates an excess supply of labor-including a macroeconomic slump with sticky
wages-gives employers the ability to pick from the queue of job applicants those whom they favor
on racial or other grounds. BECKER, supra note 1,at 62-74; MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM 108-09 (1962); RicHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 313, 616-17 (3d ed.
1986).
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TABLE 3:
TYPES OF DISCRIMINATION ALLEGED IN FEDERAL
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES, 1972-1987
NUMBER OF
ALLEGATIONS

PERCENTAGE OF
ALL CASES

Hiring

238

21.6

Discharge
Pay
Promotion/Demotion
Conditions of Employment
Retaliation
All Others

720
244
409
455
191
205

65.5
22.2
37.2
41.4
17.4
17.7

TYPE OF DISCRIMINATION

Note: This table is based on 1100 cases for which the type of discrimination could be identified.
Because plaintiffs may allege more than one type of discrimination, the percentages total more than
100%. There were 2462 different allegations of discrimination contained in our sample, for an average of 2.24 allegations per case.

the worker benefits effect discussed earlier.2 1 Employers find that discrimination against workers who sue and win is more costly during
slumps than during booms because the amount of damages paid to prevailing plaintiffs is higher during economic downturns. This increased

liability should mean that, other things equal, employers are less likely to
discriminate during slumps.

It thus appears that in some ways a sluggish economy makes it easier for an employer to discriminate but more costly if the employer gets

caught. Depending on which effect dominates, the cost of discrimination
will either fall or rise and therefore the amount of discrimination should
either increase or decrease. Because these two effects work in opposite

directions, it is impossible to say on theoretical grounds alone which will
dominate. It seems plausible, however, to conclude that discrimination

increases (or at least does not fall) during slumps.22 That is, our intuition
suggests that the availability effect dominates the employer damages

effect, although, as we discuss below, we doubt that either effect is very
strong.
21. See supra part III.A.2.
22. Anthony DePalma, Bounties and Vans: Jersey Copes with a Labor Shortage, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 1989, at BI (providing anecdotal evidence of how conditions of employment improve in an
extremely tight labor market). Glen Cain, however, concludes that the black/white income ratio is
not procyclical. Cain, supra note 1, at 799. These findings could be consistent if employers adjust
relative nonwage compensation, such as workplace quality, rather than adjusting relative wages over
the business cycle. See Sam Rosenberg, Economic Contractionsand RacialDifferentials in Male Job
Mobility, 26 INDUS. REL. 291 (1987) (demonstrating that in a recession promotion rates decline
more for black men than for white men).
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2. The Effect of a Slump on the Number of Incidents That Could
Generate Litigation
Finally, we need to consider the simplest explanation for the statistical relationship between the business cycle and the volume of federal
employment discrimination case filings: Because more bad things happen
to workers during economic downturns, the number of incidents that can
lead to an employment discrimination suit might vary over the business
cycle. Table 3 presents data from our American Bar Foundation survey
indicating that most of the suits filed allege discrimination in discharge
(firing or layoff), hiring, or promotion, all of which are presumably sensitive to the level of demand for a firm's product. Indeed, seventy-eight
percent of the 1100 employment civil rights suits in which a type of discrimination could be identified claimed at least one of these factors as a
23
basis for the suit.
A similar pattern is observed in the data on charges filed with the
EEOC. Looking across fiscal years 1982 through 1989, we find that on
average, 61.9% of all charges alleged discrimination in discharge or layoff; an additional 10.3% alleged discriminatory failure to hire.2 4
The number of rejected workers is thus likely to increase during
recessions and to fall in tight labor markets. If a constant fraction of all
rejected workers actually files suit, then the volume of suits will also
move countercyclically. We refer to this potential connection between
the business cycle and the volume of litigation as the incidents effect.
23. Note that because of multiple bases of suit, the 78% figure cannot be derived from Table 3.
24. These figures were calculated from the EEOC annual reports for fiscal years 1982 through
1989. Charges typically allege more than one basis of discrimination, so these results cannot be
interpreted as the share of all allegations of discrimination.
Although more than 66% of charges claimed discriminatory discharge or layoff during the
early 1980s, this share (and the absolute number of such allegations) fell precipitously-to 55%-in
1986; it continued at this lower level through 1989. We do not have a good explanation for this
drop-off, but it does not seem to be related to the business cycle, since the drop occurred before the
recession of the late 1980s got under way and did not worsen as the recession unfolded.
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DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN WORKER AND
EMPLOYER EFFECTS
A.

BACKGROUND

Thus far, we have shown that the observed positive relationship
between the unemployment rate and the level of employment discrimination case filings 25 may be caused by (1) the higher propensity to sue
induced by the worker benefits effect, (2) the greater amount of discrimination caused by the availability effect, or (3) the higher number of rejections generated during recessions-the incidents effect. We also know
that in the aggregate these factors substantially outweigh the employer
damages effect (which tends to inhibit employer discrimination during
recessions).26
It would be helpful to know whether the countercyclical pattern of
employment discrimination case filings is the result of worker behavior
(the worker benefits effect) or employer decisions (the availability effect
and the incidents effect). 27 Are potential plaintiffs actually more inclined
to fie suit when the unemployment rate rises? Or do the positive and
significant coefficients on the unemployment rate in the regressions in
Table 2 merely reflect the fact that during recessions, employers may
discriminate more and the number of possible incidents (especially firings) that could give rise to a lawsuit is therefore higher? The answer is
important because it allows one to attribute the source of the cycicality
in litigation volume to potential plaintiffs, defendants, or perhaps both.
If the incidents effect or the availability effect is what drives the cyclicality of litigation, then the regressions in Table 2 tell us relatively little
about what makes people sue once they have been fired or otherwise
rejected. On the other hand, if the worker benefits effect is shown to be
important, we will have demonstrated that potential plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases respond to the level of damages when calculating-explicitly or implicitly-whether to bring an employment
discrimination suit. This information may be used to help predict the
effect of the increase in damages authorized by the Civil Rights Act of
25. Note that a positive relationship between the unemployment rate and the number of case
filings implies that the relationship between the number of filings and the business cycle is negative,

or countercyclical. In other words, because the unemployment rate is countercyclical, anything that
varies positively with the unemployment rate will be counteryclical as well.
26. Column 2 of Table 11, infra, summarizes the predictions of these four effects on the volume
of cases filed in district court. See infra part VI.
27. Note that the availability effect operates whenever the unemployment rate is high. The
incidents effect is most significant when the unemployment rate is increasingsharply.
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1991 on the number of lawsuits filed. It also has paradigmatic implications, as discussed earlier.2 8 If we believe that the decision to bring a
lawsuit is essentially a psychological, cultural, or in some sense irrational
one,2 9 it should not respond to changes in incentives. Showing that
plaintiff behavior does indeed respond to changes in the economic environment-albeit with a greater degree of myopia than some economists
might suspect-lends strength to the economic analysis of litigation by
suggesting that the decision to sue is not merely a function of irrational
or noneconomic factors.
Econometric analysis of litigation behavior is extremely difficult
with the present data, which only describe the outcome of cases in terms
of the combined behavior of two parties (plaintiff and defendant), not the
separate actions of each. Either party, or both together, may be responsible for the link between unemployment rates and the volume of litigation.
That is, the increase in cases generated as the economy goes into a downturn is the sum of the worker benefits effect (plaintiff behavior) plus the
availability and incidents effects (defendant behavior) minus the countervailing influence of the employer damages effect (defendant behavior).
In sections B through E below, we explore four possible approaches
to distinguishing between worker and employer behavior. First, we
examine the behavior of suits against one particular defendant-the U.S.
government-for which we have reason to think employer effects are not
particularly strong. If (as turns out to be true) the pattern of employment discrimination cases fied against the U.S. government is still
strongly cyclical, then the worker benefits effect is the likely cause. Second, we consider the lag between the time an adverse employer action
occurs and the time a case is filed in federal court. Our theory is that the
lag should be longer if employer behavior is causing the cyclicality and
shorter if the cyelicality is driven by worker decisions to sue that are
made considerably after adverse employment outcomes have occurred.
Third, we examine whether filings of discrimination charges with the
EEOC are influenced by the business cycle and find that they are not.
Finally, we analyze the kinds of incidents that are most likely to give rise
to litigation and show that the distribution of such incidents over time is
not likely to be a function of the business cycle. In all four cases, the
evidence seems to support the conclusion that the employer effects on the
cyelicality of filing are weak, while the worker benefits effect operates
28. See supra part III.A.2.
29. See eg., BUMILLER, supra note 3.
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strongly on filings in federal court. The absence of cyclicality in complaints lodged with the EEOC suggests that potential litigants respond to
the effects of recessions but do not fully anticipate these effects.
B.

EVIDENCE FROM Sun's AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

The U.S. government is unlike private defendants in employment
discrimination cases3" because it is not subject to sales slumps that force
it to lay off workers, as is the case with many private employers. There is
thus probably no incidents effect for suits against the federal government
because the government does not fire workers more frequently during
recessions. Similarly, the employer damages effect is probably reduced
because federal officials are likely to be far less sensitive to the cost of
potential Title VII damage awards than private employers are.3 1 Moreover, it may be reasonable to assume that the availability effect is less
30. The data on employment discrimination suits classify each suit on the basis of its jurisdiction, defined loosely as the reason why federal court is the appropriate forum in which the lawsuit
should be heard. There are essentially only three jurisdictional bases that are relevant for employment discrimination cases: (1) The U.S. government is the plaintiff bringing suit; (2) the U.S. government is the defendant being sued; and (3) the suit raises a "federal question" (i.e., the suit is brought
under a federal law, such as Title VII).
About 4% of all employment civil rights cases on the AO tape involve the U.S. government as a
plaintiff, 9% involve the U.S. government as a defendant; the remaining 87% involve other defendants. In AO coding, if a case is brought against the federal government under Title VII, the "U.S.
Defendant" jurisdiction trumps the federal question jurisdiction, and the basis of jurisdiction is listed
as "U1.S. Defendant."
It is interesting that over the past 20 years, roughly 3 million U.S. government employees have
generated about 9000 suits (one suit per 6666 workers per year), while 94 million other employees
have generated about 87,000 suits (or one suit per 21,610 workers per year). Thus, suits per worker
are about 3.25 times higher among U.S. government workers than among other workers. There are
at least three possible reasons for this higher rate of employment discrimination litigation against the
federal government. First, federal government employees, who are protected by civil service rules,
are much more likely to sue their current employer than are private employees (see Table 5, infra).
Second, any government decision adverse to the employee can potentially lead to a due process
complaint, regardless of the race, sex, or age of the aggrieved individual. Moreover, because most
employment discrimination cases are brought by current and former employees (as opposed to
rejected applicants), the federal government may be sued more than private employers because it has
proportionally more minority and female employees. Third, wages in the federal sector are generally
higher than in the private sector, and therefore plaintiffs can probably win larger damage awards by
suing the federal government. Additionally, one might speculate that if the discipline of market
competition inhibits discrimination more effectively than political pressure, then the government
may actually discriminate more than private-sector firms. See Craig Zwerling & Hilary Silver, Race
andJob Dismissalsin a FederalBureaucracy,57 AM. Soc. REv. 651 (1992) (finding that black postal
employees are fired at roughly twice the rate of white postal employees, with the vast majority of the
discharges occurring during a 90-day probationary period).
31. Both government and private employers would probably like to avoid the negative publicity that attends the loss of an employment discrimination case, but private employers are probably
more sensitive than federal employers to the size of the monetary loss.
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important for the federal government than for private employers.
Because federal wages tend to be high relative to private wages, federal
employers generally have the ability to pick and choose regardless of relative economic conditions, thus weakening the ordinary link between the
economic cycle and employer discrimination (it is easier for most
employers to discriminate during recessions). In summary, all three of
the employer influences on the cyclical pattern of litigation are probably
absent or small for suits against the federal government, leaving only the
worker benefits effect to generate cyclicality in the filing of employment
discrimination cases against the United States. Thus, any relationship
between the business cycle and the volume of litigation against the federal government presumably results from the behavior of plaintiffs
because the cycle is far less relevant to the government's behavior as an
employer.3 2 Consequently, examining the cyclicality of suits brought
against the federal government should provide insight into the existence
and strength of the worker benefits effect.
Column 2 of Table 4 reports estimates of the elasticity of lawsuits
with respect to unemployment rates for suits in which the U.S. government is the defendant. The table shows that the number of suits filed
against the government varies positively with the unemployment rate, as
predicted by the worker benefits effect.
Table 4 also presents elasticity measures for two other categories of

cases: suits brought by the federal government (column 1) and suits not
involving the United States as either plaintiff or defendant (column 3).
The overall pattern that emerges from this table is that suits against the
government and all other employers are sensitive to the business cycle,
but suits brought by the government are not.3 3
32. This proposition can be tested empirically. We do so in an appendix (available from the
authors) and conclude that a very small and statistically insignificant negative relationship exists
between the federal government's employment and the unemployment rate.
33. None of the coefficients in column 1 are significantly different from zero, and some are
actually negative. We were not surprised that suits initiated by the federal government, most of
which are brought by the EEOC, are unrelated to the business cycle. First, there is no worker
benefits effect generating a higher propensity to sue during slumps for the EEOC. If the worker
benefits effect is the dominant contributor to the cylicality of lawsuits, there should be little cyclicality when this eftect is absent. Second, the other three factors may still be present in suits brought by
the EEOC; that is, the private employers sued by the EEOC may still be responding to the state of
the economy when deciding whether to discriminate (the availability effect and the employer damages effect) or generating incidents that could lead to litigation (the incidents effect). However, given
the nature of EEOC suits, which tend to be larger lawsuits challenging a pattern and practice of
discrimination over a period of time rather than more isolated events, one would expect that the
relationship between the timing of EEOC suits and the business cycle would be very weak.
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TABLE 4:
COMPARISON OF ELASTICITIES FOR THREE TYPES OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
(1969:111-1989:11, EXCLUDING NONORIGINAL
JURISDICTION AND DUPLICATES).
MODEL 1:
Dependent Variable Is Number of Cases per Quarter in Which:

(3)
(1)
U.S. GOV'T

Is
PLAINTIFF

Elasticity of No. of Cases Filed,
with Respect to:
1. Unemployment Rate
0.02
Lagged 1 Quarter
(0.04)
2. Unemployment Rate
0.26
Lagged 2 Quarters
(0.55)
3. Sum (Lines 1 + 2)
0.28

X2(2)
Mean of Dep. Variable

0.40
3.72

(2)
U.S. GOV'T
Is
DEFENDANT

U.S. GOV'T
Is NEITHER
PLAINTIFF NOR
DEFENDANT

0.42
(2.14)
0.14
(0.72)
0.56

0.56
(5.59)
0.56
(2.40)
0.80

7.20*
4.37

14.92*
6.75

(4)
MEAN OF
REGRESSOR

6.68
6.66

MODEL 2:

Dependent Variable Is Natural Log of Number of Cases per Quarter in Which:
(3)
U.S. Gov'T

(1)
U.S. Gov'T

U.S. Gov'T

Is
PLAINTIFF

Is
DEFENDANT

Is NEITHER
PLAINTIFF NOR
DEFENDANT

1.07
(2.68)
0.45
(1.14)
2.52

0.70
(4.33)
0.42
(2.61)
1.12

7.71*

10.26*

Elasticity of No. of Cases Filed,
with Respect to:
4. Unemployment Rate
0.46
Lagged 1 Quarter
(1.00)
5. Unemployment Rate
-0.21
Lagged 2 Quarters
-(0.46)
6. Sum (Lines 4 + 5)
0.25

X2(2)
1.00
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses.

(2)

(4)
MEAN OF
REGRESSOR

1.87
1.87

Model 1: Regressors were one- and two-period-lagged unemployment time, time, and a constant term. Elasticities are calculated as e,., = (a Y/8X)(X/Y), where (a Y/OX) = 13,and thus have
the same sign as the estimated coefficient from which they are derived. Underlying regression is
corrected for autocorrelated residuals using the Beach-McKinnon ML estimator.
Model 2: Regressors were a constant, time, the log of time, and the log of one- and two-periodlagged unemployment. Regressions corrected for autocorrelated residuals as above.
Likelihood ratio test: Two times the absolute difference between the log-likelihood for the current model and one with no unemployment variables is distributed X2
*= significantly different from zero at the five percent level.
Source: Administrative Office of U.S. Courts Data Tape.

q.
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Note that for column 2 cases we expect only the worker benefits
effect to operate, but that for column 3 cases we expect all four effects to
operate: the worker benefits effect, the employer damages effect, the
availability effect, and the incidents effect. This suggests that subtracting
the elasticity measure for column 2 cases from that for column 3 might
indicate the sign and size of the combined effect of the three employer
effects, because the worker benefits effect-which is constant in both
classes of cases-would be subtracted out.
Unfortunately, this approach fails for two reasons. First, although
the patterns of cyclicality are roughly similar in suits against the government (column 2) and in private suits against private employers (column
3),34 it is difficult to conclude that the cylicality of filings is greater for
either of these two classes of cases. For example, one might get a rough
sense of the magnitude of cylicality by adding the elasticities for both
quarters. 35 However, this measure suggests that private employment discrimination cases are more cyclical than cases against the federal government using the specification of model 1 and less cyclical using the
specification of model 2.36
Second, the hope of precisely measuring the three employer effects
depends on the assumption that the worker benefits effect operates identically in suits against the United States and in suits against private
employers. There are reasons, however, to suspect that the worker benefits effect is not identical in the two categories of cases, because the composition of suits against the U.S. government is quite different from those
against private employers. Many of the suits in which the U.S. government is the defendant are actually due process cases 37 rather than
employment discrimination cases per se. Civil service regulations give
government employees much stronger protection against discharge, discipline, and retaliation than private-sector workers have. As the data in
Table 5 make clear, a much higher percentage of suits by government
employees involve workers who are working for their employer at the
time of suit. This means that such workers are unlikely to have experienced any unemployment spell. For such suits, the higher potential
34. In both models for column 2 and 3, the X' tests clearly reject the hypothesis that the
unemployment coefficients are jointly zero.

35. See line 3 of model 1 and line 6 of model 2.
36. We can, however, reject the hypothesis that the unemployment coefficients in model 2 are
identical for the U.S. government and other employer-defendants (columns 2 and 3).
37. That is, plaintiffs allege that they were injured as a result of their employers' failure to
follow civil service procedures or that the procedures followed were inadequate to protect their due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment.
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TABLE 5:
NUMBER OF SUITS BY DEFENDANT TYPE AND WHETHER
OR NOT PLAINTIFF IS SUING CURRENT EMPLOYER
Number of Suits in Which Defendant (Employer) Is:
U.S. Gov'T

OTHER

TOTAL

90
(35.4)
153
11

104
(10.5)
714
175

194
(15.5)
863
186

254

993

1247

Plaintiff is suing:
Current Employer
(column percent)
Former Employer or Desired Employer
Missing
Total
Source: ABF survey of employment civil rights litigation.

back-pay award that is the basis of the worker benefits effect is missing.
Consequently, we would expect the worker benefits effect to be somewhat
less potent for suits against the government (column 2) than in purely
private employment discrimination litigation (column 3).
In sum, the elasticities presented in column 2 of Table 4 are probably best viewed as lower-bound estimates of the worker benefits effect
that operates in employment discrimination cases against private
employers. The size and significance of these elasticities suggest that this
effect plays an important role in linking the business cycle and the volume of employment discrimination litigation. In other words, potential
plaintiffs appear to alter their litigation behavior over the business cycle.
More tentatively, a comparison of the elasticities in columns 2 and 3
might suggest that the combined effect of the three employer factors is
far smaller than the worker benefits effect. 3"
C.

EVIDENCE FROM LAGS BETWEEN ALLEGED EMPLOYER
VIOLATIONS AND FILING SUIT IN FEDERAL COURT

We have provided evidence that workers are sensitive to the state of
the business cycle when determining whether to bring federal employment discrimination lawsuits.39 We have also speculated that the three
employer factors are much less important in explaining the cyclical pattern of case filings.'
38.
damages
could be
39.
40.

Note that because the availability and incidents effects work in opposition to the employer
effect, their combined influence on the cyclicality of employment discrimination case filings
small even if the individual effects were large.
See supra parts IV.A-B.
See supra part IV.B.
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In order to shed light on the potential collective significance of these
employer factors, we now examine evidence concerning the timing of the
lawsuits relative to the occurrence of the employer actions that form the
basis of the suits.
Workers who believe they have experienced discrimination on the
job do not-indeed, cannot-move instantaneously from the perceived
act of discrimination to the filing of a lawsuit in federal court. There are
both "behavioral" lags and legally mandated procedural hurdles that
introduce a delay between the occurrence of an underlying incident-the
alleged act of discrimination-and the filing of a lawsuit. We already
know that employment discrimination case filings swell one to two
quarters after a rise in unemployment. 4 ' We can now examine whether
this observed pattern is consistent with the lags in filings predicted by the
different worker and employer effects.
The key insight here is that the worker and the employer effects
must occur in a fixed order. The influence of the unemployment rate on
employer behavior (through the employer damages effect, the availability
effect, and the incidents effect) is always chronologically prior to its effect
on worker behavior (through longer durations of unemployment and
larger potential back-pay awards). What we wish to determine is
whether a downturn in the economy stimulates an increase in actual or
perceived discriminatory incidents or merely an increase in the percentage of putative victims who elect to sue. If the number of incidents rises,
then at least three quarters must elapse between the downturn in the
economy and the filing in federal court in order for the plaintiffs to meet
the procedural requirements for litigation. However, we have discovered
that the upturn in the number of cases occurs within one or two quarters,
suggesting that the cyclical pattern is not caused by the incidents effect
(or other employer behavior). Once again, the evidence suggests that the
worker benefits effect is the cause of the countercyclical pattern of district court case filings alleging discrimination in employment.
1. Legally Induced and BehavioralLags
Figure 2 provides an overview of the legal and procedural sources of
time lags. In essence, these arise from the requirement that Title VII,
Equal Pay Act, and ADEA plaintiffs exhaust their administrative remedies before they are allowed access to federal court. For several reasons,
41.

See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
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however, it is difficult to be precise about the minimum or maximum
length of these lags.
FIGURE 2:
AN OUTLINE OF THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN
TITLE VII, EPA, AND ADEA CASES
ALLEGED ACT OF DISCRIMINATION
OCCURS AT TIME to

STATE HAS ENFORCEMENT

STATE LACKS ENFORCEMENT

AGENCY

AGENCY

t8: Date by which state
agency must receive charge,
t. _5to + 240 days.

Date by which EEOC
must receive charge.
(t, + 60" _ t; <to + 300)
(tE5 to + 180)
tE:

tR. Date by which EEOC may be requested to
issue a right-to-sue letter. In theory,
tR ->tE + 180*.

tc: Date by which case must be filed
in federal court.
tc < date on which right-to-sue letter actually issued + 90.

Notes:
-

= Maximum time allowed before moving to next stage.

....-.
= Minimum waiting time required before moving to next stage.
* In addition, a charging party has 30 days from the conclusion of state proceedings to file a charge
with the EEOC. In some jurisdictions, a party may file initially with the EEOC, which forwards the
case to the state agency and then automatically takes it up after 60 days. Filing with the EEOC tolls
the statute of limitations for a Title VII suit (although not for an ADEA suit).
** Actual practice varies by jurisdiction. In some regions, right-to-sue letters may be issued immediately if the charging party so requests.
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First, as Figure 2 illustrates, the procedural requirements differ
depending on whether the alleged act occurred in a state or locality that

has an antidiscrimination agency. 42 Second, although there are formal
rules governing the process of filing an employment discrimination suit,

these rules apparently are often ignored or modified in practice.

3

More-

over, not all of the rules require the plaintiff to proceed within a certain
amount of time. Once a charge has been filed with the EEOC, the Commission is never obligated to issue a right-to-sue letter if the plaintiff does
not request one. And as long as the charge is still pending, "there is no
overall time limit... within which to file suit following the filing of an
EEOC charge" in a Title VII case. 44 Third, not all employment civil

rights cases require the plaintiff to proceed through the state antidiscrimination agency and the EEOC. Cases brought under the Recon-

struction Era Civil Rights Act" or under provisions of the U.S.
Constitution can be filed directly in federal court, and thus have no
mandatory period at all. The proportion of cases without any prefiling

procedural requirements is relatively small-perhaps ten to fifteen
percent.46

The end result of this complicated mix of procedures, exceptions,
and qualifications is that one cannot derive a precise legally induced lag
period by reference to the statute alone. At least in the period before
42. Section 706 of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5 (1988)) requires potential plaintiffs to file charges with designated state or local fair employment
agencies, where they exist, as a precursor to filing with the EEOC. By the early 1980s, most states
had created analogous agencies, although there were still a few holdouts among southern states. As
early as 1972, the EEOC "adopted a procedure under which it... automatically forward[ed] a
charge initially filed with it to the appropriate state agency and... then treat[ed] the charge as filed
with it after the expiration of sixty days." Cox, supra note 13, at 21-29 (fig. 2); see Peter Siegelman,
An Economic Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litigation (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University). Chapter 4 of Siegelman's dissertation shows that lags are longer and the
unemployment coefficients are smaller for federal lawsuits in states that have fair employment practice commissions. Id.
43. For instance, potential plaintiffs who wish to get into federal court under Title VII must
first submit a charge of discrimination to the EEOC. According to both the terms of the statute and
the EEOC's own regulations, the Commission may not issue charging parties the right-to-sue letter
until 180 days after the filing of a charge. During this 180-day period, the Commission is supposed
to investigate the charge and, when warranted, institute conciliation procedures. But because of the
Commission's substantial backlog of investigations, some, but not all, district offices long ago began
issuing right-to-sue letters as soon as charges were fied. BARBARA SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 916 (1976).

44. Id. at 915.
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1988).
46. Table 1 reveals that as many as 85% of federal employment discrimination cases involve
either Title VII or age discrimination claims and are therefore subject to the administrative filing
requirements.
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some EEOC regional offices started to issue right-to-sue letters almost
immediately after charges had been filed with the Commission, a plausible minimum lag pattern for a Title VII case that was pursued expeditiously in a jurisdiction with a state enforcement agency might have
looked like this: thirty days to retain a lawyer and file a charge of discrimination; sixty days of waiting in the state agency before the EEOC
would process the complaint; 180 days of waiting for a right-to-sue letter
from the EEOC; and thirty days to draft and file a federal court complaint. The total: 300 days lag between the violation and filing in federal
court. The end result of this set of hurdles is that 300 days-three and
one-third quarters-would have elapsed from the time of the alleged discriminatory act until the case arrived in federal court.
2. Survey Results
The American Bar Foundation's employment discrimination study
has examined approximately 1250 employment civil rights cases in considerable detail. By looking at the case files themselves, we were able to
determine in 1049 cases the date on which the violation (i.e., the act of
discrimination) allegedly occurred and to calculate the lag between the
occurrence of the event and the date the case was filed in federal court.4 7
Figure 3 summarizes the distribution of these lag lengths. The
median lag was five quarters (fifteen months), the modal lag was 3.5
quarters, and only 26.5% of the cases had lags of less than three quarters.
Accordingly, our speculation about minimum filing lags computed
above4 8 seems reasonable. Because the distribution of lags is quite
skewed, the mean lag between the occurrence of an alleged violation and
the filing of a suit in federal court of 8.34 quarters (twenty-five months)
was substantially higher than the median lag. Although the maximum
lag was sixty-seven quarters, only ten percent of the cases had lags of
more than sixteen quarters.
47. Calculating the lag is not completely straightforward for violations occurring over a period
of time or when there are multiple violations. Fortunately, most of the complaints concerned either
termination alone or termination plus some other discriminatory action, such as unequal pay. In
cases of violations over a period of time, we designated the incident giving rise to the complaint as
having occurred on the date of job termination if the plaintiff was no longer working for the
employer-defendant. If the plaintiff was still employed by the employer-defendant, however, we
designated the violation as having occurred at the start of the continuing violation period, rather
than at the end. The six complaints about prospective violations were calculated as having a lag of
zero.
48. See supra part IV.C.I.

1993]

737

LAW AND MACROECONOMICS

E
u
>

A)

W

N

r

I--

C9

cm

zz

OZU

I.

t,-

SE

-. >
0

c

m

co

U)

U

MI
v

N

~~
S3SVJ O

-

cu

\\\\\\\\\\\

F-7-7 T

C
W

I38mavN

Lo)

V-

m)

N~

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:709

TABLE 6:
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON DISTRIBUTION OF LAG
BETWEEN OCCURRENCE OF VIOLATION AND FILING OF
LAWSUIT IN FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
IN THE ABF SAMPLE (IN QUARTERS)
(1)

(2)

(3)

ALL

CASES RAISING A

ALL OTHER

CASES TrrLE VII CLAIM
1. Median Lag
5.04
5.52
2. Average Lag
8.34
9.35
3. Standard Deviation
10.46
11.45
4. Modal Lag
3.5
3.5
5. % of Cases with Lag Less Than 3 Quarters
26.5
22.7
Total Number of Cases
1049
812
Source: ABF seven-city sample of employment discrimination cases.

CASES
4.04
5.05
4.61
0.5
40.0
237

One might also want to consider the lag separately for different
kinds of cases: Table 6 thus presents some summary data, disaggregated
by type of case. Cases that do not raise a Title VII claim take less time to
get to court than those that do, as a comparison of columns 2 and 3
suggests. Because Title VII cases make up seventy-five percent of the
sample, however, the distribution of lags in Title VII cases is quite similar to that shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 reveals that in both the Title VII cases and the entire sample more than seventy percent of the cases had lags of at least three
quarters. Yet in regressions of the volume of cases on the unemployment
rate, these lag values are never either large (relative to the coefficients on
other lags of unemployment) or statistically significant, as demonstrated
by Table 7.49 In other words, our earlier speculation that it would take
at least three quarters for a Title VII case to be filed in federal court5 0 is
confirmed by our actual survey data: The vast majority of cases are filed
at least three quarters after the alleged discriminatory incident occurred.
However, the upturn in filings resulting from increased unemployment
during recessionary periods occurred only one or two quarters after the
economy worsened.
This result constitutes additional evidence of the relative unimportance of the employer effects and buttresses the argument that the cyclical pattern of case filings is caused by plaintiff rather than employer
49. See also supraTable 2.
50. See supra part IV.C.1.
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behavior. If the unemployment rate were influencing the volume of litigation through its effect on the number of rejected workers, we would
expect to see the sample distribution of lags between violation and filing
date match up with the distribution of lags between an economic downturn and the jump in filings estimated from the regressions in Table 7.
Instead, the lags from event to filing, presented in Figure 3, are considerably longer than the lags estimated by regressions 1 through 6 in Table 7,
which suggests that the unemployment rate has its dominant effect on
the volume of suits via plaintiff behavior after the incident giving rise to
the suit has already occurred. This is clearly consistent with the importance of the worker benefits effect, because a longer duration of unemployment leads directly to a higher potential back-pay award.
The preceding discussion on the relative importance of the incidents
effect and the worker benefits effect based on a comparison of the lag
structure in the filing of actual cases with that implied by the regression
coefficients on lagged values of the unemployment rate is marred by a
certain imprecision. The incidents effect predicts that employment discrimination case filings will rise when more workers start losing jobs
through discharge or layoff, which is probably best proxied by the change
in the unemployment rate. The worker benefits effect predicts an
increase in case filings when it is difficult for workers to find a job, which
is probably best proxied by the level of the unemployment rate.5 1 In fact,
both of these proxies are imperfect because of the complex nature of the
concept of the unemployment rate. At any point in time, the unemployment rate depends on the net effects of (1) the rate at which workers lose
their jobs through firing and layoffs, (2) the rate at which unemployed
workers are hired, and (3) the rate of movement from "out of the labor
force" (not working and not looking for work) into unemployment. All
three flows are themselves dependent on the level of the unemployment
rate. Although the first of the three is probably the best measure of the
volume of incidents that could give rise to employment discrimination
litigation, these data are unavailable.
It is possible to ask econometrically whether the volume of litigation
responds to the change in the unemployment rate or to its level.
Although this is by no means a perfect test of the incidents effect versus
the worker benefits effect, a finding in favor of changes in the unemployment rates would argue against the worker benefits effect. In fact, however, our tests reveal that it is the level of the unemployment rate, rather
51.

Another business cycle measure might be the capacity utilization rate.

40
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TABLE 7:
REGRESSIONS EXPLAINING THE NUMBER OF
EMPLOYMENT CIVIL RIGHTS CASES FILED IN FEDERAL
COURTS, 1969:IV TO 1989:11
EQUATION

Variable
Constant

Time
(1-79)
Time2
Unemployment Rate
Lagged I Quarter
Unemployment Rate
Lagged 2 Quarters
Unemployment Rate
Lagged 3 Quarters
Unemployment Rate
Lagged 4 Quarters
Summary Statistics

Rho-hat

Adjusted R2
Durbin-Watson

SSR (xl0 - 5)

1

2

3

-685.65 -681.24 -243.85
(-5.89) (-5.06) (-1.34)
28.61
28.87
49.84
(4.54)
(4.32)
(4.83)

-0.13
-0.13
-0.35
(-1.80) (-1.75) (-3.02)
90.26
89.85
(4.99)
(4.86)
38.60
39.62
(2.32)
(2.14)
7.85
8.24
30.06
(0.43)
(0.44)
(1.48)
-2.44
-15.53
(-0.13) (-0.76)
0.60
0.95
2.10
7.98

0.60
0.95
2.10
7.98

0.76
0.93
2.07
11.30

4
20.13
(0.74)

-0.08
(-0.28)
90.13
(4.78)
35.38
(1.89)
1.98

(0.10)

5
23.70
(0.85)

6
50.60
(1.67)

-0.12
-0.41
(-0.40) (-1.26)
85.66
(4.30)
37.40
(1.96)
0.22

17.40

(0.01)

(0.36)

-14.46
-35.95
(-0.72) (-1.73)
0.22
2.48
9.81

0.21
2.48
9.74

0.02
2.25
12.47

Notes: For regressions 1-3, the dependent variable is the number of original jurisdiction non-U.S.
government plaintiff, non-U.S. government defendant employment civil rights suits filed per calendar quarter. These equations contain maximum likelihood corrections for AR1 autocorrelation in
the residuals. Regressions 4-6 are the first-differenced versions of 1-3, estimated using OLS. All six
equations were estimated over 79 quarters. T-statistics are in parentheses.
Sources: Administrative Office of U.S. Courts Data Tape (number of employment discrimination
suits); Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business (nonseasonally adjusted unemployment rate).

than the change in the rate, that influences the volume of litigation, supporting the importance of the worker benefits effect-in which a longer
duration of unemployment leads directly to a higher potential back-pay
52
award.
52. Here we present an intuitive justification for a test of whether it is changes in the unemployment rate or the rate itself that influences the number of suits filed. Let Y, be the volume of
litigation in quarter t, a be a constant, U, be the unemployment rate in quarter t-l, and U 2 be the
unemployment rate in quarter t-2. If we assume that what matters is the level of the unemployment
rate in periods t-1 and t-2 rather than the change in the unemployment rate between the two periods,
the appropriate equation to estimate is
Y,=a + 6,U,+6U 2 .
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D.

ARE EEOC FILINGS CYCLICAL?

We have just established that even though it takes at least three
quarters to get to the federal courthouse from the time of an alleged discriminatory practice, there is a sharp upturn in antidiscrimination complaints filed in federal court one or two periods after the economy turns
downward. In other words, the incidents that lead to the bulge in complaints tend to occur before the economy goes into recession. In a typical
year, more than 100,000 complaints of employment discrimination are
filed with the EEOC. These represent the class of cases from which the
roughly 8000 annual federal district court filings are drawn. Our findings
on the lags suggest that aggrieved workers do not decide to initiate the
complaint process with the EEOC when the economy turns downward.
Rather, of the large class of individuals who have already initiated
administrative proceedings in the EEOC, a significantly larger percentage of those who are considering pressing the case on to federal court will
actually do so if the economy turns downward. This may imply that
aggrieved workers commonly complain to the EEOC but that as they
return to work they let their case lapse if the EEOC response is not satisfactory. Those who are still out of work when the economy goes into a
downturn are more likely to pursue their claim to federal court.
We offer the following hypothesis: Alleged acts of employment discrimination and EEOC complaints based on them occur at a fairly constant rate throughout the business cycle. Months after these events have
occurred, aggrieved workers are more likely to advance their claim to
federal court if the economy has worsened (presumably because they
have had difficulty finding alternative employment, which will swell their
back-pay damages in a successful suit).
If instead we believe that the change in the unemployment rate is what influences the volume of
litigation, we would specify our model as
Y,=Y+8(U,- U2).
The second equation can also be written as
Y,=+5U,-U 2 .
This is just a special case of the first equation, in which the coefficients 01 and 02 have identical
magnitudes and opposite signs, which provides the basis for an empirical test. We first run the
unconstrained version of the equation (the first model). We then impose the restriction that
)fl+62=0 and reestimate the equation. If imposing the restriction results in a significantly worsefitting model (as measured by the increase in the sum of squared residuals between the unconstrained
and the constrained versions), then we reject the restriction and with it the idea that changes in the
unemployment rate influence the volume of litigation.
This is exactly what happens in practice: The appropriate F-test (with (1,73) degrees of freedom) has a value of 100.18, which implies that the constraint significantly impairs the fit of the
model, and therefore that it is the level of unemployment, rather than its change, that determines the
volume of litigation.
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One testable implication of this hypothesis is that filings with the
EEOC should not be characterized by the same cyclical pattern that we
have observed for filings in federal district court.
We confirmed this proposition by running regressions similar to
those employed in exploring the cyclicality of filings in federal court,
although, owing to the limitations of the EEOC data, we were obliged to

use annual rather than quarterly filing data. Our results are reported in
the first three columns of Table 8, which reveal that no statistically significant relationship exists between the unemployment rate and annual
EEOC filings. 3 In order to be certain that the lack of cydlicality in
EEOC filings is not simply the product of our use of annual rather than
quarterly filing data, we converted our data on federal court filings into

the same annual format. Columns 4 through 6 of Table 8 show that the
same cyclical pattern in district court case filings that we previously identified with quarterly data emerges with the annual data. Clearly, if any
cyclical pattern in the filing of EEOC charges exists, it is less strong than

the cyclical pattern in the filing of employment discrimination cases in
the federal courts.5 4
The model of the decision to sue that we set forth earlier" required
litigants to make some judgment about the expected costs and benefits of
filing suit. On average, a prospective Title VII litigant who is discharged

or not hired during a recession is likely to be out of work longer and thus
entitled to a greater back-pay award (should the suit be successful) than a

prospective litigant who is discharged or not hired during a boom. Given
this, it may be somewhat puzzling that the same pattern of cycicality

that we attribute to the worker benefits effect does not emerge at the
EEOC filing stage. There are two possible explanations for this finding.
53. Originally, the EEOC reported its annual case filings under a fiscal year beginning on July
1. In 1976 the agency switched to a fiscal year beginning October 1. As a result the 1976 EEOC
filing figure covers 15 months rather than 12. We adjusted for this by splitting this 15-month period
into a 12-month period (July 1, 1975, through June 30, 1976), to which we assigned 80% of the
EEOC charges, and a three-month period (July 1, 1976, through September 30, 1976), to which we
assigned the remaining 20%. We then included a dummy variable in our regression to identify this
shortened period from July through September 1976.
54. While the effect of the detrended unemployment rate on EEOC filings is not statistically
significant in Table 8, the positive coefficients on the unemployment rate variables provide some
evidence of cyclicality. Indeed, it is conceivable that these coefficients could become statistically
significant with a greater number of observations than we had for this annual time series. Nonetheless, even if the coefficients in columns I through 3 rose to significance, they would still show a
weaker cyclical pattern than that found for case filings in columns 4 through 6. Specifically, computing the elasticity of filings with respect to the previous year's unemployment rate (from columns 3
and 6) led to a figure of 0.352 for EEOC filings and 0.607 for court filings.
55. See supra part III.A.1.
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TABLE 8:
REGRESSIONS EXPLAINING THE NUMBER OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CHARGES AND CASES,
1970-1987
EQUATION

EEOC CHARGES
2
3
Constant
15501.9
15480.1
15492.6
(1.91)
(1.91)
(1.98)
Time
10495.0
10486.6
10499.6
(1-80)
(4.81)
(4.81)
(4.99)
Time
-274.0
-273.2
-274.3
(-2.22) (-2.22)
(-2.31)
Unemployment Rate
74.41
(.03)
Unemployment Rate 3876.3
3812.1
3895.9
Lagged 1 Year
(1.38)
(1.37)
(1.50)
Unemployment Rate
326.3
Lagged 2 Years
(0.12)
Summary Statistics
Rho-hat
0.27
0.26
0.28
0.91
0.92
Adjusted R2
0.91
Durbin-Watson
1.87
1.88
1.87

Variable

1

Dismcr
4
-5.5
(-0.01)
855.1

(5.91)

COURT FILINGS

6

5
-23.4

-14.3

(-0.04)

(-0.03)

850.7

858.0

(6.09)

(6.19)

-17.9

-17.4

(-2.19)

(-2.22)

-18.0
(-2.31)

68.7

(0.42)
453.2

409.7

470.9

(2.75)

(2.77)
251.4
(1.74)

(3.02)

0.39
0.96
1.76

0.45
0.96
1.60

0.37
0.96
1.79

Notes: For regressions 1-3, the dependent variable is the annual number of charges filed with the
EEOC. For regressions 4-6, the dependent variable is the annual number of original jurisdiction,
nonduplicate employment civil rights suits filed in U.S. district courts. Although we do not report
the coefficients, we used a dummy variable to identify the quarter from July-September 1976. This
was necessary for the first three equations in order to adjust for the EEOC's changed fiscal year, but
we employed the parallel approach for the last three equations to maintain consistency between the
EEOC and court filing regressions. These equations were estimated with maximum likelihood corrections for ARI autocorrelation in the residuals. The unemployment rate figures are detrended. Tstatistics are in parentheses.
Sources: EEOC Annual Reports; Administrative Office of U.S. Courts Data Tape (number of
employment discrimination suits); Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business (nonseasonally adjusted unemployment rate).

First, filing with the EEOC is both a low-cost event-all it requires is
filling out a one-page form-and something that must be done quickly in
order to preserve the right to bring a lawsuit in the future. Given that
the cost of filing with the EEOC is essentially zero and the time frame for
filing is very short, there is little chance for the operation of the worker
benefits effect because everyone who might want to sue later files a discrimination charge with the EEOC. Therefore, the short filing deadline
for and the low cost of EEOC filings probably dampen the operation of
the worker benefits effect on the filing of EEOC charges.

The second reason for the absence of a significant worker benefits
effect at the EEOC filing stage is that workers have less information
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about how long they will be out of work-and thus about their expected
damages-at the time they must decide to ifie with the EEOC than when
they have to decide whether to file a lawsuit in federal court. Of course,
if potential litigants were farsighted, they would presumably realize that
a termination that occurs in a recession will be more costly than one that
occurs in a boom. The lack of cyclicality in EEOC filings coupled with
the strong cyclical pattern in federal court filings suggests, however, that
although litigants will react to the changed incentives of the higher backpay awards when they know they have been out of work for some time as
their case grinds through the EEOC, they are not good at anticipating
that in a recessionary economy they will likely be unemployed longer
than they would in a boom time. In other words, the absence of a strong
worker benefits effect operating on the filing of EEOC charges suggests
that prospective litigants are myopic in their decision making (or at least
ignorant of the likely connection between the current health of the economy and the duration of their current spell of unemployment).

E.

EVIDENCE FROM THE KINDS OF INCIDENTS THAT LEAD
TO LITIGATION

The lack of cyclicality in the filing of employment discrimination
charges with the EEOC also provides strong evidence that the cyclical
pattern of district court filings is not caused by the incidents effect. One
conclusion to be drawn from this finding is that workers do not complain
more about discrimination simply when times are bad. (If they did, the
EEOC filing pattern would be countercyclical, but it is not.)5 6 It may
seem puzzling that the incidents effect does not appear to be an important factor contributing to the cyclical pattern of federal court filings.
The answer to this puzzle may be that while bad employment outcomes
are more common during hard economic times, not all such outcomes
are equally likely to generate employment discrimination litigation.
Being the victim of a plant closing, for instance, may be more common
during a business downturn, but it is not clear that being fired for alleged
misconduct or poor performance is more likely to occur in downturns,
and our impression is that the latter type of termination is more likely to
generate a complaint of discrimination than the former.
56. The lack of statistically significant cyclicality in EEOC filings comports with the similar
lack of cyclicality in worker and union filings of unfair labor practice charges with the National
Labor Relations Board. ROBERT FLANAGAN, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION

96-97 (1987).
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Any failure to hire or promote, as well as any firing or layoff, provides plaintiffs with an opportunity to file a lawsuit. But in considering
whether such incidents (let us call them "rejections") are likely to produce litigation, it is worth distinguishing between "microeconomic rejections"-those in which an individual worker's productivity is at issueand "macroeconomic rejections"-those caused by macroeconomic factors, such as economic downturns. 57 Most rejections seem to be caused
by macroeconomic factors rather than by an employer's adverse assessment of an individual worker's performance. Naturally, the number of
such rejections rises when the economy goes into a slump-fewer applicants are hired at such times, existing job holders are laid off or discharged, and promotion rates slow down. Most of the incidents that lead
to employment discriminationlitigation,in contrast, seem to be individual
specific and therefore much less subject to the broad cyclical swings associated with macroeconomic terminations. 8 This in turn may explain
why the incidents effect does not appear to be the factor linking the business cycle with the volume of litigation.5 9
57. In a macroeconomic termination or nonhiring, insufficient demand for a firm's output,
combined with wage/price stickiness, causes the firm to reduce production and lay off or decline to
hire workers. Janet Madden makes a similar distinction in slightly different terms: "Unlike workers
who are fired or involuntarily laid-off because their personal productivity is lower than that of other
available workers, the layoff of a displaced worker is exogenous to the worker, that is, is not the
result of his or her individual job performance." Janet F. Madden, GenderDifferences in the Cost of
Displacement An Empirical Test of Discriminationin the Labor Market, 77 Am. ECON. REV. 246,
246-47 (1987). Put another way, in a microeconomic incident neither the firm's labor demand nor
its output decrease because the employer presumably replaces the rejected employee. In a
macroeconomic incident, output and employment do, and are intended to, decline after the firing.
58. Note that the employer damages effect and the availability effect are conflicting factors that
might influence microeconomic rejections. In other words, an employer who is thinking about firing
a worker from a protected class might refrain in a slump out of fear of the potentially larger damages. On the other hand, the employer can more easily replace the minority or female worker with a
white male. For the reasons just discussed, we suspect that these effects are relatively modest.
59. We believe that individuals are most likely to sue if they have been discharged for misconduct or poor performance rather than laid off because a macroeconomic downturn has reduced the
demand for the firm's product. However, it is possible that firms will be more likely to discharge
personnel during downturns, which would thereby lend some cyclicality to microeconomic rejections. Specifically, individual-specific firings might have some macroeconomic causal component if
employers' costs of discharge are procyclical. That is, in a tight labor market, an employee caught
stealing might nevertheless be retained, while the same offense would be punished by dismissal in a
slack labor market, in which a replacement worker could be easily found or a replacement might be
unnecessary altogether. We doubt, however, that this factor will generate a significant pattern of
countercyclical discharges for misconduct or poor performance. First, personnel experts generally
argue against such discretionary practices. That is, they suggest that prespecified rules about what
constitutes an offense warranting discharge are appropriate and, indeed, are widely used. See, eg.,
RICHARD PERES, DEALING WITH EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 133-34 (1978); JAMES 1L
REDEKER, EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE: POLICIES AND PRACTICES 55 (1989); ALAN F. WESTIN &
ALFRED G. FELIU, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES WrrHOUT LITIGATION 219 (1988); see
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Because the two kinds of rejections (microeconomic and
macroeconomic) are somewhat vaguely defined, evidence of their relative
proportions is difficult to come by. If it is true that individuals choose to
sue only when they have been specifically rejected and not when there is
a massive temporary or permanent layoff, then we would like to know
the ratio of such discharges to all involuntary terminations.' Robert
Topel notes that "temporary layoffs... account for as much as ninety
percent of unemployment spells among workers who have separated
from their previous jobs (quits, discharges, and layoffs). '6 1 This statement implies that discharges constitute far less than fifty percent of all
involuntary terminations.6 2 In contrast, 80.8% of the cases in the
Dertouzos study of 120 California wrongful termination trials involved
firings based on "inadequate performance [by the plaintiff]," whereas
63
only 19.2% were based on "exogenous economic factors.
also Hubert S. Feild & Willalim H. Holley, The Relationship ofPerformanceAppraisalSystem Characteristicsto Verdicts in Selected Employment DiscriminationCases, 25 AcAD. MGMT. J. 2, 392-406,
397 (1982) (noting that half of all firms whose performance-evaluation policies were challenged had
specific written instructions for evaluating workers' performance). Second, if employers are much
stricter during slumps, workers will be more careful during these periods. Knowing that they can be
replaced more easily in a slump than in a boom, they should reason that the expected penalties for
engaging in theft, tardiness, or other forms of misconduct are higher in a slack labor market. This
factor should dampen the number of on-the-job thefts during recessions, notwithstanding that the
motivations for thievery may be higher during slumps. Thus, the probability of dismissal for a
worker caught stealing should be higher in slack labor markets, but the probability that a worker
will steal may well be lower. The net result, we suspect, is that the number of individual.specific
discharges for theft, absenteeism, and other similar offenses is likely to be fairly constant over the
business cycle.
60. Involuntary terminations include discharges, temporary layoffs, and permanent layoffs.
Some employment discrimination cases are brought by workers who have just quit their job in protest over some allegedly discriminatory conduct on the part of the employer, but this is a relatively
small proportion of the total caseload.
61. Robert Topel, On Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance, 73 Am. ECON. REv. 541, 541 n.2
(1983). Although not all separations generate a spell of unemployment, Topel's statement refers
only to those that do. This is the relevant class of separations for our purposes because there is no
possible damage award in a Title VII case if the rejected worker can immediately secure equally
lucrative employment elsewhere. Thus, it is almost certain that a discharged worker who brings a
Title VII claim will have experienced a spell of unemployment. The exception would be a worker
who immediately secured employment but at a much lower wage, although we consider this scenario
to be somewhat rare.
62. If temporary layoffs constitute 50% of the total number of separations-involuntary separations plus resignations-then temporary layoffs must make up more than 50% of involuntary
separations, excluding resignations. Macroeconomic terminations also include some permanent separations (e.g., due to plant closings), which means that macroeconomic separations must constitute
substantially more than 50% of all involuntary separations. Conversely, microeconomic separations
(i.e., discharges) must account for less than 50% of all involuntary separations.
63. JAMEs DERTOUZOS ET AL., The Legal and Economic Consequences of Wrongful Termina.
tion, in THE RAND CORPORATION INSTrUTE FOR CIVIL JusncF REPORT 21 (tbl. 4). These data
should be interpreted with caution, however, because they are based on the defendant's statement of
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Similarly, a substantial fraction of the employment discrimination
disputes in the American Bar Foundation's sample of such cases" are
framed in terms of the performance of individual plaintiffs, usually in
comparison with "bench mark" white male workers. (For example, X, a
black female, asserts that she was fired for being late for work three
times, while white male employees Y and Z, who were late more often
than she was, were kept on.) Barbara Schlei and Paul Grossman suggest
that this pattern is common, citing numerous cases in which individual
plaintiffs contested-their discharge on the ground that others who committed the same infractions were not similarly disciplined.6" For example, consider only two of the numerous cases they describe: In Alexander
v. Gardner-DenverCo.,66 the black male plaintiff was fired for producing
"excessive" amounts of scrap, even though white employees allegedly
made equal or greater amounts of scrap than the plaintiff. And in Martin
v. Chrysler Corp.,67 a black production worker alleged that he was discharged for falsifying his work count while white workers who falsified
their work count were not discharged.6 8 Courts, as well as plaintiffs,
often view discrimination this way.69
Thus, even though most job losers (i.e., terminated employees) are
victims of industrywide or economywide slumps, most job losers who sue
have probably lost their job because of some individual-specific factor,
such as a bad work evaluation.7 0 This appears reasonable, given that it is
much more difficult to prove discrimination when 100 workers are laid
why the discharge occurred. Employers have a natural incentive to represent the plaintiff in as
negative a light as possible in the context of a suit alleging unlawful discharge. Accordingly, the
80% figure may overstate the true proportion of discharges based on inadequate performance.
64. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 1.
65. See ScHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 43.
66. 519 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1058 (1976).
67. 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 329 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
68. In a somewhat different context, see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273
(1976) (involving the dismissal of white employees charged with misappropriating property from
their employer but not a black employee accused of the same).
69. See, eg., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (holding that an
employer's possible dissimilar treatment of whites and blacks is relevant when assessing whether the
stated reason for failing to hire a black applicant was a pretext). The same kinds of intracompany
worker comparisons are used in discharge cases: "The plaintiff must ... produce evidence of disparate treatment [of blacks and whites] from which the court may infer" that a discriminatory discharge has occurred. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 43, at 511.
70. Even the first part of this statement may be open to question. Daniel S. Hamermesh suggests that worker displacement (i.e., job loss by workers with significant labor force attachment) is
not strongly cyclical, perhaps because industry-specific factors, such as foreign competition, dominate macroeconomic factors in accounting for job loss (as opposed to temporary layoffs). Daniel S.
Hamermesh, What Do We Know About Worker Displacement in the US.?, 28 INDus. REL. 51-59
(1989).
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off in a sales slump than when a single worker is fired for some alleged
malfeasance.7 1 The implication of this conclusion is that the kinds of
incidents that produce most of the employment discrimination litigation
are not likely to vary in proportion to the tightness of the labor market.
The fact that an individual-specific discharge underlies most suits thus
casts further doubt on the incidents effect as the explanation for the cyclicality of litigation volume.
V.

THE PATTERN OF OUTCOMES IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION OVER THE
BUSINESS CYCLE

Thus far we have demonstrated that the volume of litigation (but
not EEOC charges of discrimination) responds to the business cycle and
that there are a number of worker and employer effects that could
explain the observed countercyclical pattern of case filings. On the basis
of both indirect econometric evidence and on theoretical grounds, we
have argued that the worker benefits effect is the most important factor
linking the business cycle and the volume of employment discrimination
litigation. We now extend this analysis to show that litigation outcomes
also vary over the business cycle. Once again, we will explore the various
worker and employer effects that could influence the quality of cases that
make it to federal court. (Presumably case outcomes reflect the quality
of the cases brought.) Our argument for the importance of the worker
benefits effect is strengthened by evidence that plaintiffs are less likely to
win cases that are brought during economic downturns, and that the
awards to plaintiffs who do win are higher during a slumping economy
than during other periods.
A.

VARIATION IN THE

QuALrrY OF SumTS

BROUGHT OVER THE

BusINEss CYCLE

The simplest possible economic model of the decision to file suit suggests that there should be a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the plaintiff win rate. After discussing this theoretical
prediction, we will examine the effect of complicating the model-by
allowing for (1) variation in the threshold wage needed to bring a lawsuit, (2) nonrandom selection of disputes through settlement, and (3)
71. This may not be true for "reductions in force," in which older employees-typically,
midlevel managers-are discharged and replaced by younger workers. Such discharges frequently
produce age discrimination litigation.
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changes in employer behavior over the business cycle. These complications tend to dilute the prediction of procycical win rates.
1.

Worker Effects

This section discusses two worker effects that affect the quality of
employment discrimination cases brought over the business cycle: the
worker benefits effect, which also influences the volume of case filings,
and the worker wage effect.
a. The worker benefits effect: As discussed earlier,72 the worker
benefits effect implies that the damages awarded to a plaintiff in a successful employment discrimination suit vary over the course of the business cycle because the typical spell of unemployment after termination is
greater in a slump than in a boom. One can summarize this relationship
formally by writing B=B(U), where B is the back-pay award in a successful suit, U is the unemployment rate, and dB/dU > 0, so higher
unemployment rates imply greater average back-pay awards.
In considering whether to sue, the plaintiff must determine the
expected net benefit of bringing suit. This requires the litigant to consider the costs of suit,73 which we will call C, the likely back-pay award,
B, and the probability of succeeding at trial. Under Title VII rules,
plaintiffs pay their own costs only if they lose their suit, so the expected
net benefits of suit are E(NB) = pB(U) - (1-p)C, where p is the
probability that the plaintiff will prevail at trial. Obviously, p will vary
depending on the "quality" of the plaintiff's case-strong cases have
high values for p.74
Plaintiffs will decide to sue when the net expected benefits are positive. That is, a plaintiff will sue if and only if pB(U) - (1-p)C > 0.
This implies that where C is fixed, the minimum probability of victory
needed to justify bringing suit is negatively correlated with the amount of
damages awarded if the suit ends in victory (i.e., when B falls, p rises,
and when B rises, p falls).7 5
72. See supra part III.A.2.
73. These are likely to be known with some precision in advance of the decision to litigate. In
what follows, we assume that the plaintiff is risk neutral, which simplifies the analysis without altering the results in any fundamental way.
74. This is a crucial feature of the Priest/Klein model of settlement. See Priest & Klein, infra
note 84, at 62-63.
75. We can solve mathematically for the threshold value of p below which potential plaintiffs
will decide not to sue and above which they will sue. Recall that
pB(U) - (1-p)C = 0
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To illustrate, suppose a suit costs $1000 to bring (C = 1000) and
that at a five percent unemployment rate, the average plaintiff will get a
$5000 award if successful (B = 5000). This implies that a litigant with

an estimated probability of success of 0.20 (p = 0.20) would calculate
the net expected benefit of the suit to be $200, because (2)(5000) -

(8)(1000) = $200. A risk-neutral plaintiff would be expected to bring
such a suit. In fact, as long as the litigant's odds of winning are one in six

or greater there is a net expected gain from litigation, so the suit will be
brought. Suppose that the unemployment rate rises to 7.5% and that the
size of the award rises to $8000. Given the 0.20 probability of victory,
the suit is now worth $800, because (2)(8000) - (8)(1000) = $800.
Indeed, with the higher unemployment rate and concomitant higher
average back-pay award, the plaintiff would need only a one-in-nine

chance of victory to justify bringing suit. Thus, when unemployment
rises and average back-pay awards increase, plaintiffs will bring marginal
suits with a lower probability of victory that would not otherwise have
been brought. This implies that the average quality of suit and the

probability of victory are lower for suits filed in quarters with high unemployment. Plaintiffs should therefore win fewer of the cases brought during such periods. 6

b. The worker wage effect: The previous section illustrates how
some potential litigants who have less meritorious or less provable claims
of employment discrimination will find it worthwhile to bring them if the
defines the threshold condition, which implies that the reservation or threshold probability, p*, can
be defined as
p* = C/[C+B(U).
Differentiating with respect to U, we have
dp*/dU = -CB'/[C+B] 2 < 0,
because B' = dB/dU > 0. Thus, an increase in the unemployment rate implies a decline in the
minimum probability of victory necessary for a plaintiff to bring suit.
The effect of a change in unemployment on the plaintiff win rate is smaller under the Title VII
fee-allocation rule (one-way fee shifting) than under the typical rule (no fee shifting). Without fee
shifting, dp /dU is -CB'/B 2 , which is greater than -CB'/[C+B] 2 under Title VII rules. Intuitively, this is so because under Title VII rules a change in the probability of winning simultaneously
raises expected benefits and lowers expected costs. Under the typical non-fee-shifting regime, costs
are fixed regardless of who prevails, and the plaintiff's expected costs do not depend on the
probability of success. Thus, a change in the probability of victory has a greater effect on expected
net benefits for a Title VII plaintiff than for a plaintiff under normal fee-shifting rules. For any given
decrease in damages awarded, Title VII plaintiffs need less of an increase in the probability of victory
to maintain their willingness to bring suit.
76. We should stress that the causal mechanism for the lower average win rate for cases filed
during recessions is not that the recession lowers the success probability for any given case, but
rather that more low-probability cases are fied during such periods, thereby degrading the quality of
the average suit.
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gross benefit of suit, B, goes up. Thus, if the effect of an increase in
unemployment is to drive B up, the average value of plaintiffs'
probability of success, p, should move in the opposite direction (i.e., if
unemployment goes up, p should go down). But a more discerning analysis shows that the gross benefit from a successful Title VII lawsuit can
be written as B=wD(U), where w is the plaintiff's wage and D(U) is the
duration of unemployment, which is a function of the unemployment
rate (i.e., dD/dU > 0). With this formulation, we can rewrite the decision rule for whether to bring suit as pwD(U) - (1 -p)C > 0. The earlier formulation contemplated a simple relationship in which the average
plaintiff win rate, p, falls when average benefits, B, rise. The reformulation shows that as D rises, either p or w can move in an offsetting fashion. Thus, rather than only the reservation quality of the plaintiffs case,
p*, being a function of the unemployment rate, the plaintiff's reservation
wage also depends on the business cycle.
For any given quality of the plaintiff's case, when the unemployment rate increases and the duration of unemployment goes up, the
threshold wage needed to justify bringing a lawsuit tends to fall. In other
words, lower-wage plaintiffs will find it increasingly worthwhile to bring
suit as the unemployment rate increases. Changes in the threshold wage
will weaken the relationship between plaintiff win rates and the business
cycle. Indeed, if all the adjustment were to occur in the threshold wage,
the win rate would be constant over the business cycle, with plaintiffs'
average wages falling as the unemployment rate rises." Therefore, the
prediction that emerges from examining the two worker effects is that the
plaintiff win rate should fall during business downturns because of the
worker benefits effect, although this tendency might be dampened by the
worker wage effect.
77. That is, when both w and p are functions of U, we can write:
w = [C - p(U)CJ/p(U)D(U),
so that
aw * laU -=[pDCp' - (C - pC)(pD' + Dp')]/(pD).
If all the adjustment is in w rather than in p, then p' = 0, so
aw* a U = - (C - pC)pD'/(pD).
In this case win rates are unaffected by the business cycle and only the threshold, w*, moves with the
unemployment rate.
Even if threshold wages rather than the quality of plaintiffs' cases adjust to the business cycle, a
relationship between unemployment and the win rate might nevertheless be detectable. Lower-wage
plaintiffs are presumably less sophisticated, have poorer legal representation than those with higher
wages, or both, and may therefore prevail less often for any given level of case quality. A negative
relationship between the unemployment rate and the win rate might therefore exist, not because the
average quality of cases changes over the business cycle, but because of changes in the quality of
legal representation or in the plaintiff's legal sophistication.
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2. Employer-Driven Suit Quality Effects
The employer effects that we discussed in our analysis of the cyclical
pattern of the employment discrimination caseload7" may also influence
the pattern of case outcomes over the business cycle. Thus, in seeking to
clarify the relationship between the unemployment rate and plaintiff win
rates, we must once again consider the operation of the incidents effect,
the employer damages effect, and the availability effect.
Let's begin with the incidents effect: Suppose that a constant proportion of all fired plaintiffs bring suit in each quarter, regardless of the quality of the underlying claims they have.79 In quarters of high
unemployment, most terminations are recession-induced group layoffs
rather than individual-specifti terminations for poor performance. To
prevail, plaintiffs must prove that they were treated differently from
others because of their race or sex. But such claims are harder to sustain
when a diverse group of workers has been laid off for macroeconomic
reasons than when the plaintiff has been singled out for something the
plaintiff is alleged to have done. Thus, case "quality" may vary over the
business cycle even if plaintiffs are irrational (i.e., if they do not make the
decision to sue by calculating the expected net benefits of their suit), simply because discriminatory firing is harder to prove during slumps than
during booms.
The employer damages effect implies that discrimination is curtailed
during slumps because the price of discrimination-the cost of paying
back-pay damages to employment discrimination plaintiffs-is higher in
a weak economy.80 Conversely, the availability effect postulates that
there might be more discrimination during slumps than booms because
employers can pick and choose from among their more preferred class of
workers according to discriminatory preferences." Just as they did in
our earlier discussion of case filings, 2 these two effects yield conflicting
predictions about the pattern of plaintiff win rates. If the employer damages effect dominates, plaintiffs should fare worse in cases filed during
periods of high unemployment because the evidence of discrimination is
presumably less convincing during such periods. The exact opposite is
true if the availability effect dominates. Thus, the incidents effect and the
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See supra part III.B.
This would seem to be inconsistent with rational behavior.
See supra part III.B.1.
Id.
Id.
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employer damages effect lead to procyelical plaintiff win rates and the
availability effect leads to countercyclical plaintiff win rates.

As summarized in the third column of Table 11, if the worker benefits effect on quality of suit is stronger than the employer effects, then we
would expect plaintiffs to win a higher proportion of cases filed in booms

than in recessions. Nonetheless, the magnitude of this effect should be
diluted to some degree by another worker effect-the tendency of plain-

tiffs to fie some highly meritorious but lower-wage suits during recessions. The employer effects, though likely to be less important for the

reasons discussed previously with respect to the cylicality of the
caseload,8 3 are again in conflict.
3.

Selection Effects
One of the key findings to emerge from empirical studies of litiga-

tion conducted over the past decade is the importance of selection
effects. 84 These effects occur because parties do not randomly decide
which disputes will become filed legal claims or which claims will be
settled (or dropped) as opposed to litigated to a final judgment. Thus,

filed claims and litigated cases do not represent random samples from the
population of all claims, and any generalization from such samples to the
larger population must be made with extreme care.
Indeed, there are reasons to suspect that selection effects (along the
lines proposed by George Priest and Benjamin Klein)85 are operating in
this context.8 6 We have argued that the higher back-pay awards induced
by recession will prompt weaker cases to be pursued, yet these are precisely the cases that are most likely to be settled through the selection

process.8 7 In our context, settlement of particularly strong or weak cases

83. See supra part IV.
84. Eisenberg, supra note 4; James Hughes & Edward Snyder, Policy Analysis of MedicalMalpractice Reforms: What Can We Learn from Claims Data?, 7 J. Bus. & ECON. STAT. 423 (1989);
George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. I
(1984); Edward Snyder & James Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs. Evidence
Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 2, 345-80 (1990); Stewart Schwab & Theodore
Eisenberg, The Influence of Judicial Background on Settling and Winning Cases and a Study of the
Dispute Pyramid (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors).
85. Priest & Klein, supra note 84. See also Samuel Gross & Kent Syverud, Getting to No: A
Study ofSettlement Negotiationsand the Selection of Casesfor Trial,90 MICH. L. REv. 319 (1991).
86. We discuss the issue of selection effects at greater length in Peter Siegelman & John J.
Donohue III, The Selection of Employment Discrimination Suits for Litigation: Using Business
Cycle Effects to Test the Priest/Klein Hypothesis (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
American Bar Foundation).
87. Indeed, as we show in idL, a higher proportion of cases filed during recessions is settled than
of cases filed during booms.
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means that the effect of unemployment on win rates will be diluted by the

selection process; estimates of the unemployment coefficient should thus
be biased toward zero.

Although sophisticated methods are available that can correct for
this problem,88 they require access to individual data for each case in the
population,8 9 data we do not have. Instead, therefore, we adopt a sim-

pler strategy. Our argument is an a fortiori one: Sample selection should
weaken the relationship between unemployment rates and plaintiff win
rates. Thus, if we find any link between the two rates, we can be confident that the relationship exists and would be even stronger in the

absence of sample selection. Without more detailed information about
individual cases, we cannot estimate the magnitude of the selection effect.

Hence, the best we can do is develop a lower-bound estimate of the true
effect of the unemployment rate on the plaintiff win rate.
B.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF PROCYCLICAL PLAINTIFF WIN RATES

We used data on the outcomes of federal employment discrimination cases from 1977 through 1989 to ascertain the relationship of the
unemployment rate to the plaintiff win rate.
Outcome data are only meaningful for closed cases. By definition,
cases that are still in the process of being adjudicated lack a final outcome. Thus, we begin by restricting the sample to closed cases. To avoid
overinclusion of cases with unusually long or short durations, the sample
was limited to cases opened between 1977:I and 1988:111.90 For each
88. The pioneering work on sample selection is James Heckman, Sample Selection as a Specification Error, 47 ECONOMETRICA 153 (1979). Snyder & Hughes, supra note 84, and WILLIAM
GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (1990), provide cogent analyses of the problem in applied
contexts.
89. The strategy is typically to estimate two equations. The first is the selection equation,
which gives the probability that each case will be litigated, as opposed to settled or dropped, as a
function of the attributes of that case (e.g., the size of defendant firm, the plaintiff's occupation,
whether the plaintiff has a lawyer). The second equation then estimates the probability of plaintiff
victory as a function of individual case characteristics, such as presence of a lawyer and the unemployment rate. The estimated probability of litigation from the first equation must be included as an
explanatory variable in the second, thus yielding unbiased coefficient estimates. In our context, the
problem is more complicated than this because the dependent variable in the second equation also
has a dichotomous (logit or probit) structure. For an explanation and application, see Synder &
Hughes, supra note 84.
90. We began by sorting all cases by the date they were originally filed and then removing all
those that were still open when the AO tape ended, on June 31, 1989. Arranged in this manner, the
average duration of the closed cases appears to decrease as the filing date moves closer to June 31,
1989: Any case filed in June 1988 that closed before June 1989 has a maximum duration of one year;
any case filed in July 1988 has a maximum duration of 11 months; and so on. If there is a relationship between the duration of a case and its outcome, using all closed cases increasingly overincludes
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calendar quarter between 1977:11 and 1988:111, we tabulated the number
of cases ified in that quarter that were ultimately won by the plaintiff and
the number won by the defendant. The plaintiff win rate in quarter t is
thus the number of cases filed in quarter t that are ultimately won by the
plaintiff, divided by the total number of cases filed in quarter t won by
either plaintiff or defendant. 91 The adjudication rate in quarter t is the
ratio of the number of cases ified in quarter t and won by either party (or
both) to the total number of closed cases filed in quarter t.9 2 (The win
rate and the adjudication rate are graphed in Figure 4.)
Weighted (grouped) logit regressions were then used to estimate the
effect of time and unemployment rates on the plaintiff win rate. 93 Table
9, which tests the predictions of our theoretical model by regressing the
plaintiff win rate in each quarter on time and lagged unemployment
short cases as the filing date approaches June 1989 and could thus impart a spurious time trend to
the win rate. The reverse is true for cases fied before June 31, 1978, when the AO started keeping
track of outcomes. As a crude way of avoiding these problems, we limited the sample to cases filed
between 1977:1I and 1988:II. These dates were chosen because the average case lasts approximately
four quarters.
Including all closed cases for which we have outcome data does not substantially change any of
the results we report herein.
91. That is,
WINRA TE = PWIN,/(PWIN, + DWIN),
where t is the quarter in which the case was filed, PWIN, is the number of cases filed in quarter t that
were ultimately won by plaintiff, and DWIN, is the number of cases fied in quarter t in which the
defendant prevailed. Note that defining the win rate as
(PWIN, + BOTHWIN,)/(PWIN, + BOTHWIN, + DWIN),
where BOTHWIN, is the number of cases listed as won by "both parties," does not change our
results in any important way.
92. The adjudication rate in quarter t is thus
ADJRATE, = (PWIN, + DWIN + BOTHWINJ)/(PWIN, + DWIN + BOTHWINt +
OTHERd), where OTHER, includes cases coded "other" and those coded "missing."
93. Weighted logit is appropriate when using grouped data in which the underlying model is
discrete (a 0/1 variable, such as plaintiff loses or wins) and the observed dependent variable is a
proportion. This occurs when "a number of respondents have the same values of the independent
variables and the observed dependent variable is the proportion of... [respondents] with individual
responses equal to l." WILLIAM GREENE, LIMDEP MANUAL 19.3 (198). This is precisely the
situation with the AO data because we have no information about any individual case, except for the
outcome, that would enable us to distinguish it from any other case filed during the same quarter.
Consider two different quarters: In the first, two cases are filed and the plaintiff wins one of
them. The win rate for this quarter is 0.5, or 50%. In the second quarter, 100 cases are filed and the
plaintiff wins 50 of them. Again the win rate is 50%. Clearly, however, the estimated win rate for
the second quarter is more precise (i.e., has a lower variance) and should be given greater weight
than the first in estimating the overall win rate across all periods. The "group data" specification
corrects for this heteroscedasticity by weighting each quarter's observation on WINRATE by the
number of cases in the sample that were filed in that quarter-that is, weighting by
(PWIN,+DWIN). See tables 9 and 10 for these results.
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rates, supports the theory that workers bring weaker cases during economic downturns.9 4 Most of the unemployment coefficients are different
from zero at the conventional five percent level of significance; all have
the predicted negative sign. Because of multicollinearity between oneand two-quarter-lagged unemployment, the coefficients in model 3 are
not estimated precisely, and therefore the individual unemployment coefficients are not statistically significant. However, the likelihood ratio test
of model 3 versus model 1 (a simple alternative containing only a constant and a time trend, with no unemployment rate) easily rejects the
hypothesis that both unemployment coefficients are zero at the 0.05
level. 95
The unemployment effect is small in magnitude. For example, suppose that the unemployment rate for the period had been constant at five
percent instead of its actual average of 7.34%.96 The results in Table 8
imply that the average plaintiff win rate would have risen only from
21.4% to 22.4%. Thus, plaintiffs would have won only 257 (4.9%) more
cases than the 5204 they actually won, an extra 5.6 plaintiff victories per
quarter. 97 Figure 5 graphs the actual win rate, as well as the fitted values
and the simulated effect of a constant five percent unemployment rate.
Despite the small magnitude of the unemployment effect, it seems
highly unlikely that the relationship between win rates and unemployment could be an artifact of the data. The clerks who code the outcome
data at the closing of each case are presumably unaware of the unemployment rate during the quarters before the case was filed. Thus, any
errors in coding introduced by these clerks could not plausibly be correlated with unemployment rates.
C.

SIZE OF AWARDS TO SUCCESSFUL PLAINTIFFS

A key finding of this Article is that a variety of tests supports the
importance of the worker benefits effect as the cause of both the
countercyelical pattern of case filings and the procylical pattern of win
94. The regressions also suggest that there is a negative time trend to the win rate-that is,
plaintiffs prevail less frequently over time. It is possible that this finding merely reflects the general
upward trend in the unemployment rate, which encourages more marginal suits to be filed.
95. In estimating the regressions presented in Table 9, we used detrended unemployment rates.
We also ran the same regressions using actual unemployment rates and got virtually identical results.
96. Of course, this is not a realistic possibility, given policymakers' current inability to control
the macroeconomy.
97. This calculation was made on the basis of a model using time, time, and the unemployment rate lagged one and two quarters as independent variables and assumes, contrary to fact, that a
change in the unemployment rate has no influence on the total volume of cases, only on the plaintiff
win rate.
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TABLE 9:
GROUPED LOGIT REGRESSIONS EXPLAINING PLAINTIFF
WIN RATES 1977:11 TO 1988:II (STANDARD ERRORS IN

PARENTHESES)
MODEL

1
Variable
Constant
Time Trend
Time 2

-0.99*
(0.07)
0.0056*
(0.0001)

2
- 1.00
(0.07)
-0.0054*
(0.0013)

3
- 1.00*
(0.07)
0.0054*
(0.0013)

4
-0.24
(0.33)
-0.034*
(0.012)
0.00025*
(0.00011)

Unemployment Rate
-0.001
in Previous Quarter
(0.02)
Unemployment Rate
-0.028*
-0.027
-0.025**
Lagged, 2 Quarters
(0.014)
(0.023)
(0.014)
Nobs
24,403
24,403
24,403
24,403
-(Log-Likelihood)
12,637.4
12,635.3
12,635.3
12,632.6
Likelihood Ratio
X2(I)= 4 .2 *
X2(2)= 4 .2*
X2(2)=9.6*
Test (vs. model 1)
Notes:
1. The grouped logit specification is based on 45 quarterly observations of WINRATE, but uses
all 24,403 observations on case outcomes (win or loss for plaintiff). See text for further explanation.
Dependent variable weighted mean = 0.214; weighted standard deviation = 0.022; minimum =
0.174; maximum = 0.280.
2. Detrended unemployment rates were obtained as the residual from a regression of unemployment rate on a constant, Time, and TimeO.
3. Likelihood ratio tests: two times the absolute value of the difference between the log likelihood
for model I and the competing mode is distributed X2(,j, where j is the number of restrictions relaxed
(variables added) in moving from model I to the alternative model.
4. -(Log-Likelihood) for model with constant term only (all slope coefficients constrained to be
zero) = 12,646.5. For all four of the models above, one can always reject the hypothesis that all
slope coefficients are zero at the five percent level.
• Significant at the five percent level.
•* Significant at the 10% level.

rates. The theory of litigation we developed implies that, in addition to
the volume and outcome of litigation, the amount awarded to successful
plaintiffs should also be a function of the business cycle. Indeed, the
existence of the worker benefits effect requires that successful plaintiffs
who bring suit when the economy is slumping win larger awards than
those whose suits originate when the economy is strong. Given the way
the law calculates back-pay damages, this link between the unemployment rate and the size of awards to successful plaintiffs seems plausible in

theory. Since it is crucial to the worker benefits effect, however, it would
be useful to know if the relationship between unemployment rates and
award size is also detectable in the data.
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Table 10 confirms that a rise in the unemployment rate one or two
quarters before a case is filed does indeed generate a larger award to successful plaintiffs.9". Specifically, a one percentage point increase in the
unemployment ratd raises the average award to a successful plaintiff by
between $2000 and $3000. 99

Two cautions are in order in interpreting this result. First, the statistically significant relationship between award size and lagged unemployment rates applies only to cases decided by a judge." ° The

relationship is much weaker for cases decided by. a jury. Second, the
estimates in Table 10 are made conditional on a plaintiff victory. But our
theory really suggests that the probability of plaintiff victory is itself a
function of the unemployment rate and should move in the opposite

direction from the amount awarded to plaintiffs who do prevail. In
another paper, we employ a more sophisticated technique to test for the
negative relationship between the probability of a plaintiff victory and the
amount awarded to the successful plaintiff. We find that the probability
of victory and the size of the expected award do indeed move in opposite
directions over the course of the business cycle. 10 1
98. We note our reservations about the quality of the Administrative Office data on award size.
Specifically, the data tape is supposed to indicate the award in thousands of dollars (so that an entry
of "4" means $4000). We were therefore surprised to learn that 95 cases were deemed to have
awards in excess of $10 million To assess the accuracy of the data tape, we searched LEXIS for all
95 of these cases and for 34 other cases drawn from the sample of awards listed as being between $1
million and $10 million (the highest possible entry). Of these 129 awards, the published opinions
contained information about the dollar award in 28 cases (22%). In every case, the amount of the
award shown on the tape vastly overstated the actual amount awarded by the court. For example, in
one case the tape listed the award as "3863" (in thousands), while the correct numberforattorney's
fees was 38.63. (The damages award in that case was actually $106,635; costs of $12,452 were also
awarded.) In another case, the tape listed "2700" when the true number in thousands was 27
($27,000). In another case, an award that should have been 70 ($70,000) appears as 7000 (which we
would have interpreted as $7 million). As a result, we were forced to delete 301 awards (of a total of
4581 positive awards) listed as having been larger than $1 million. Our tests of awards less than $1
million thankfully revealed a higher degree of accuracy, which persuaded us to repose confidence in
the regression process to screen out the effects of what we hope are randomly distributed errors.
99. Suppose the one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate causes the average
worker to be unemployed for an additional five weeks. The coefficient estimates in Table 10 imply
that the plaintiff's weekly wage would equal between $400 and $600 per week, which seems plausible. See supra note 13.
100. We have stressed that it is tie limitation of Title VII damages to back pay that drives the
cyclical pattern of filings and award sizes. For the period in which our data were collected, Title VII
cases were required to be tried by judges, and therefore any case that was tried to a jury was not a
Title VII case and did not have monetary damages limited exclusively to back pay. Consequently,
one might well expect that judge- and jury-decided cases would not have the same pattern of award
size. This was confirmed by a Chow test. The magnitude of awards in jury-decided cases did not
fluctuate with the business cycle.
101. Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 86. The technique used is described in GREENE, supra
note 88, at 736.
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TABLE 10:
REGRESSION EXPLAINING THE REAL VALUE OF
PLAINTIFF AWARDS (IN CASES DECIDED BY A JUDGE),
1977:1 TO 1988:111 (STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES)
Variable
Constant

(1)
22521.70*
(5176.69)
-108.01
(104.85)

(2)
20364.92*
(5163.29)
-113.63
(103.27)
3111.10*
(1176.26)

(3)
21348.13*
(5520.77)
-108.29
(104.96)

(4)
20811.71*
(5439.92)
Time Trend
-113.69
(103.25)
Detrended Unemployment
3216.95*
Rate, Lagged 1 Quarter
(103.25)
Detrended Unemployment
2865.72
-1270.95
Rate, Lagged 2 Quarters
(4651.11)
(1242.85)
N
772
772
772
772
-(Log-Likelihood)
9229
9225
9227
9224
Adj. R (OLS regression)
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
Rho-hat
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.01
Durbin-Watson
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
Notes: All regressions were estimated with maximum likelihood correction for AR1 errors.
Dependent variable is the amount awarded plaintiff divided by the consumer price index
(1967= 100).
Significantly different from zero at the five percent level.

VI.

CONCLUSION

We have shown that the business cycle strongly influences the volume of federal employment discrimination cases, the likelihood of success for plaintiffs, and the magnitude of awards to successful litigants. At
some level, this should not be very surprising. After all, macroeconomic
disruptions are complicated and momentous social events. It would be
odd to imagine that their effects would not show up in the legal system.
What is novel and interesting about this Article is our attempt to
specify a small number of effects that link the business cycle and litigation and to test empirically which of these effects is responsible for the
observed link. The evidence suggests that the most important connection
between macroeconomic performance and employment discrimination
litigation is not that the number of litigation-generating incidents rises
during recessions. Rather, the key link is what we have termed the
worker benefits effect, which is based on the fact that potential victims of
employment discrimination receive higher damage awards when they
have been out of work for longer periods of time. Because business
downturns are associated with longer average spells of unemployment,
damages tend to rise during such periods. Higher potential damage
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awards cause an increase in the number of suits filed. The prospect of
greater awards for successful complaints also encourages some less meritorious (or less easily proved) discrimination claims to be brought, which
is reflected in the data as lower plaintiff win rates for cases brought during recessions.
Table 11 summarizes some of the major findings of the Article. It
documents that the five theoretical predictions concerning the worker
benefits effect all conform to the empirical data. Conversely, the theoretical predictions concerning the three employer effects-the incidents
effect, the availability effect, and the employer damages effect--depart
from the empirical findings of the Article in a number of dimensions.
Table 11 highlights our reasons for rejecting the closest competitor
to our preferred worker benefits effect-the incidents effect, which posits
that an increase in the number of unfavorable employment decisions during business downturns induces more employment discrimination cases
to be filed during such periods. The incidents effect yields correct predictions about the volume of court filings, plaintiff win rates, and award size,
but it incorrectly predicts a time lag of three to four quarters between an
economic downturn and case filing even though the actual duration of
the lag is only one to two quarters. If the incidents effect drove our
results, we would expect that the filing of EEOC charges would be at
least as cyclical, and probably more so, as district court filings, when in
fact the opposite is true. Moreover, as we argued earlier, 10 2 one
employer who is unlikely to have a cyclical pattern of discharge such as
that predicted by the incidents effect-the federal government-is still
sued on a fairly pronounced countercyclical basis, which suggests the
importance of the worker benefits effect.
On the basis of our findings, we conclude that workers are more
sensitive than employers to possible increases in damage awards caused
by the business cycle. We can make use of this fact and the findings in
this Article to speculate about the effect on the volume of employment
discrimination litigation to be expected from the increase in monetary
damages authorized by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Our analysis is as
follows:
(1) We know that a one percent increase in the unemployment rate
is associated with a roughly 0.7% increase in case filings. 10 3
102.
103.

See supra part IV.B.
See our calculation, supra text accompanying note 9, based on Table 2.
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TABLE 11:
SUMMARY OF THE PREDICTED INFLUENCE OF FOUR

WORKER AND EMPLOYER EFFECTS LINKING THE
BUSINESS CYCLE AND EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION
DISTRICT
COURT CASE
EEOC FILINGS

FILINGS

PLAINTIFF
WIN
RATES"

AwARD

LAGS (IN

SIZE

QUARTERS)

THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS

Worker
Benefits
Effect

No Effect (on
Myopic
Decision
Makers)

Private &
Gov't*
Countercyclical

Procyclical

Countercyclical

1-2

Incidents
Effect

Countercyclical

Procyelical

Countercyclical

3-4

Availability
Effect

Countercyclical

Pvt. Countercyclical,
Gov't not
Pvt. Countercyclical,
Gov't not

Countercyclical

Uncertain

3-4

Employer
Damages
Effect

Proeyclical

Proeyclical

Countercyclical

3-4

Procydlical

Countercyclical

1-2

Pvt. proeyclical,
Gov't not
.ACTUAL PATITERN

No Effect

Both Pvt. &
Gov't
Countercyclical

Notes:
* Private suits are those brought by private individuals against employers other than the U.S.
government. Government suits are those brought by private individuals against the U.S. government.
** The strong version of the Priest/Klein model suggests that there should be no relationship
between the plaintiff win rate and the unemployment rate; the weak version allows for incomplete
selection and some systematic relationship (which we here find to be negative-that is, procyclical).

(2) We contend that this increase is generated by the following
causal chain: A one percent increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a one percent increase in the duration of the average spell of
unemployment," which generates a one percent increase in the size of
potential damage awards, which in turn spurs the greater volume of
litigation.105
104. See supra note 14. Similar calculations could be made using an elasticity measure of 1.5.
105. The increase in cases in response to unemployment rate increases could conceivably be
generated by an alternative causal mechanism rather than potential litigants responding to the
higher expected damages. One might offer a psychological theory positing that individuals file
employment discrimination suits when they feel moral outrage at perceived employer misconduct.
This could lead to the cyclical pattern we have attributed to the worker benefits effect, depending
upon how badly the worker is hurt by the adverse employer action. Presumably, this harm would be
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(3) We hypothesize that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 will cause a
seventeen to twenty-five percent increase in the average size of damage

awards for successful plaintiffs filing under the Act.106

(4) In the absence of any employer response to the higher damage
awards, a seventeen to twenty-five percent increase in award size might
be expected to increase the volume of cases by twelve to eighteen

percent.

07

(5) Because employers are likely to respond to increased potential
damages, we estimate that the actual increase in litigation will be closer
to nine to twelve percent.108
greater during recessions. According to this theory, the dimension of the harm generates cyclicality
rather than the opportunity for gain through litigation. Both theories would appear to be consistent
with the evidence presented in this Article, but they might generate sharply different predictions
about the effect of raising the possible damage awards in employment discrimination cases. For
example, if the psychological theory is correct, the higher potential damage awards of the new Civil
Rights Act might lead to no increase in cases. We doubt that this theory is correct, however,
because even if litigant behavior is dominated by responses to perceived morally objectionable behavior and its consequences, most litigants will need to find an attorney, who will likely respond to the
expected damages from litigation. Accordingly, we favor the economic theory over the psychological theory.
106. How much will the new Act increase the average award size for successful plaintiffs? This
depends on a great number of issues, including (1) the distribution of cases according to employer
size because different monetary caps alply to punitive damages in sex discrimination cases depending upon the size of the firm; (2) the prevalence of punitive damage awards and their ultimate size;
and (3) the frequency and size of compensatory damage awards that go beyond the current level of
back-pay damages. The ultimate effect of these factors could lead to consequences similar to those
observed in ADEA cases, where cases involving willful violation receive twice the damages ordinarily awarded in typical Title VII litigation. If this occurs, we might see a potential doubling of
damages in all non-ADEA employment discrimination cases that could not already allege intentional discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, under which compensatory and punitive damages
were previously available. This class of cases would make up roughly 33%-50% of the employment
discrimination cases. But plaintiffs in these cases would also recognize that perhaps only half of all
successful litigants would be awarded the higher compensatory or punitive damages. Thus, 17%25% of the litigants might be striving for a 100% higher damage award. We use the 17%-25%
figure as a very rough lower-bound estimate of the expected increase in the average award size for
successful plaintiffs resulting from adoption of the tougher penalties under the new Civil Rights Act.
If jury awards in federal employment discrimination cases were to more closely imitate awards in
state wrongful discharge actions (compared with previous ADEA cases, as we speculated), then
average award size would grow far more significantly.
107. The estimated increase in the volume of employment discrimination lawsuits is based on a
presumed elasticity of 0.7.
108. If employers responded strongly to the higher potential awards by trying to reduce the
likelihood of plaintiff success--either by decreasing discrimination or by taking measures, such as
documenting employment decisions more thoroughly, that enhance employer success in litigationthen the increase in the volume of litigation could be curtailed or even eliminated. One lesson to be
gleaned from this paper, though, is that employer responses to higher damage awards seem less
powerful than worker responses to monetary inducements to pursue litigation. Accordingly, we
reduce the estimated pure worker response of a 12%-18% increase in litigation by one third, leaving
the estimate of increased litigation at 9%-12%.
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In summary, using a conservative estimate of the possible increase in
potential damage-award size under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, we
expect to see roughly 10,000 more complaints filed with the EEOC and
800 to 1000 more cases filed in federal district court each year. Moreover, we anticipate that the increased ability of plaintiffs to obtain significant compensatory and punitive damages, regardless of the degree of
back-pay damages that might be available, will dampen the strong cyclical pattern in case filings, win rates, and settlement rates documented in
this Article.

